Oxford University Press will soon publish Travis Timmerman's new book, Not to Be: Death, Immortality, and Rational Attitudes (forthcoming 2027). The description reads, in part: Deprivationists hold that death is prudentially bad insofar as it prevents one from living additional net good life. This book defends a simple version of deprivationism and then explores the relationship between death’s badness and various interrelated questions that deserve more attention. Timmerman begins by defending an account of overall harm that applies to all events, including death. He then shows how deprivationism can be made immune from the problems normally thought to plague it before arguing that it’s superior to its Epicurean, categorical desire, and annihilationist rivals. From there, Timmerman turns to questions about immortality, first offering an intuitive argument for its desirability. He then argues for the extremely counterintuitive conclusion that two infinitely good lives could be equally valuable, even when one contains far more suffering. Timmerman concludes with an extended exploration of the surprising relationship between the overall value of death and how to feel about it. Stay tuned for OUP information on advance ordering.
KEYWORDS: Death; Deprivationism; Epicureanism: Annihilation: Categorical Desires; Immortality; Infinite Ethics; Population Ethics; Procreation Asymmetry; Fitting Attitudes.