Ramanell Center.

The Center for Clinical Ethics and Humanities in Health Care, established at the University at Buffalo in 1994, is now the Romanell Center for Clinical Ethics and the Philosophy of Medicine. The name change honors the 2003 testimentary gift bestowed by Edna Romanell, while reflecting a focus on bioethics in today's complex health care concerns. As a multi-disciplinary center with a long tradition of coordinating academic activities, the Center is poised to expand collaborative research and experience-based learning at UB to better serve the communities of Western New York, Southern Ontario, and borders beyond our own.

James Cordeiro, “On the Moral Permissibility of Elective Ectogestation” American Journal of Bioethics 23 (5):116-118 (2023) Cordeiro’s commentary  addresses the moral permissibility of “elective ectogestation” (EE) which  receives sparse treatment in this otherwise admirable review. Continue reading.

Romanell Center Director, David Hershenov, is featured in a video interview hosted by PhilStuff. Hershenov discusses the relationship between personal identity and the ethics of abortion. He addresses questions and topics such as: What is personal identity? Why personal identity? Brain death; Twinning and fusion; Conjoined twins; Brain transplant; Some interesting puzzles; Bias in the bioethics community. See the YouTube video, here.

Jack Freer, Artist

Since retiring from clinical medicine, Jack Freer has been spending more time working on pastel painting. This image depicts a scene in Florence during a 1629-31 outbreak of bubonic plague.

TMB Journal publishes paper by Robert Kelly

Robert Kelly.

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics (TMB)  Journal has published the paper, "Towards a Dispositionalist (and Unifying) Account of Addiction", by RCCE Fellow Robert Kelly. Paper Abstract: Addiction theorists have often utilized the metaphor of the blind men and the elephant to illustrate the complex nature of addiction and the varied methodological approaches to studying it.

A common purported upshot is skeptical in nature: due to these complexities, it is not possible to offer a unifying account of addiction. I think that this is a mistake. The elephant is real – there is a there there. Here, I defend a dispositionalist account of addiction as the systematic disposition to fail to control one’s desires to engage in certain types of behaviors. I explain this position, defend the inclusion of desires and impaired control, and flesh out the notion of systematicity central to my account. I then try to show how my dispositionalist framework can unify the disparate, seemingly incompatible accounts of addiction (and their respective methodological approaches). I close with a brief plan to extend and implement my account.