Applied Ethics, Philosophy of Mind/Cognitive Science
111 Park Hall
UB North Campus
Buffalo NY, 14260-4150
Phone: (716) 645-0145
Fax: (716) 645-6139
PhD, University of Memphis
Though my focus is on exceptional teaching, I have a number of research interests that inform the courses I develop or teach. My research primarily pursues intersections between the philosophy of cognitive science and applied ethics, most especially regarding nonhuman animals and neurodivergent persons. Additionally, I am interested in both aesthetics and the metaphysics of death.
Vincent, Sarah. “A Comparative Perspective on Social Cognition from the 4-E Approach,” Mind-Reading Brains (forthcoming).
Vincent, Sarah; Ring, Rebecca; Andrews, Kristin. “Normative Practices of Other Animals,” The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology (2018).
Vincent, Sarah; Gallagher, Shaun. “Are Chimpanzees Socially Enactive?: From False Beliefs to True Interactions,” The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animals Minds (2017).
Vincent, Sarah. “Interspecies Intersubjectivity: On its Possibilities and Limitations,” The Southwest Philosophy Review, vol. 31, no. 1 (Jan. 2015).
Vincent, Sarah. “The Myth of the Mental (Illness),” Dimensions of Moral Agency (2014).