The overwhelming majority of legal scholars and philosophers reply that, even if it turns out that human conduct is fully determined by forces over which they lack control, we ought to
fair. The difficulty is not, as Justice Kennedy recently suggested, that we lack consensual standards for evaluating the fairness of partisan representation.
In Part II, I argue that the new doctrine lacks coherence, at least when comity and federalism concerns function as a quasi-jurisdictional bar at the threshold of litigation in federal
I suggest that reasonableness review lacks a standard in part because the doctrine misapprehends how meaning is constructed, treating all meanings as arising in the same way.
It highlights the impact of the practice on the life and rights of the girl-child and examines the extent to which the lack of legislation against this practice has allowed
In cases where consumers lack specific expectations, we argue that courts should apply the risk-utility test to minimize unanticipated accident costs to consumers and firms.
