“Artists,” as the Reverend William Gilpin said in 1782, “universally are mannerists in a certain degree. Each has his own particular mode of forming particular objects; the figures of Rubens are full-fed, those of Salvator Rosa, spare and long-legged” (Gilpin 79). This was not a reproach on his part, merely an observation. And it was only when he set such particularity and consistency against the infinite variety of nature—and to the Reverend Gilpin his idea of the picturesque, the subject of his writing, required always variety—that he was prepared to recognize limits in what he also called the varied sameness of these artists. Yet he might have said, as we might too, that it is this very sameness that makes a Rubens a Rubens, or a Rosa a Rosa. And if, to describe such consistency he called up a term, mannerist, that even then could carry negative connotations, this did not diminish the force of his essential point, that artists work with a consistent manner, or as we might now more usually say, with a consistent style. There is indeed more to this; that clearly then and clearly now, even in the tumultuous world of contemporary art—though as with someone like Sigmar Polke there can be exceptions—without such stylistic consistency an artist might not be recognized to be an artist.

This idea of consistency raises a number of questions. Perhaps the term style itself to describe such a situation has become now, as George Kubler once put it, grey with fatigue. But it is still there necessarily as a part of our histories and if, over the years, the idea within it has lost much of its force, when considered at specific instances of its usage it regains some of its original power. Thus to do this, to reinvigorate the term style, or manner, I began here, to show the persistence of the question, in the late 18th century with the statement by the Reverend Gilpin that all artists are mannerists. Later I pick up a comment about the problem of style, or mannerism as he chose to call it, from the artist John Constable, speaking in the early years of the 19th century.

These comments have their own historical places. But, in the end, my primary concern here, beyond showing the persistence of the situation, is to use them to think about the meaning of the term maniera, manner, found in an earlier text, that of Le Vite by Giorgio Vasari, published first in Florence in 1550 and then again in 1568. There in Vasari—and the dictionary tells us he used the term in his text almost two thousand times—maniera carried several levels of meaning, in each instance the nuances of meaning being derived from their use within the narrative, their consuetudo, as the humanists of the time would say, or as
this idea has recently been described, their place within the semantic structures of the language known to the writer.¹ There is much of the meanings of the term in such instances that can be captured from contemporary language and there are many studies in this vein that are still of interest—I am thinking here of the work of John Shearman, Antonio Pinelli, Elizabeth Cropper, and Sidney Freedberg, among many others. But the remarks of the Reverend Gilpin and of John Constable, anachronistic as they are, allow us to call up the meanings of the term in different ways, recognizing both the force and the limits of its meanings as it appears in the distinct instances of his text. The term style, *stile*, it should be noted, only came to be used in art criticism widely in the 17th century.²

We begin then with the point of the comment by Reverend Gilpin. At the widest level, Vasari could say that a work might be recognized as being in a certain manner or style: *la maniera antica*, that is to say the Greek or Roman style; *la maniera etrusca*, the Etruscan style; or *la maniera greca*, that is to say what we now call the Byzantine style. Such categories, however specific or general, depended on the wider historical distinctions Vasari made between what he called the old and the antique, “quello che io chiami vecchio ed antico” (VM 1: 242), the antique being the classical, the old being the works produced from the time of St. Silvester from the 4th century onwards. Yet there were other categories he could also invoke, these being based more on national characteristics, the Italian manner, *la maniera italiana*, the Flemish manner, *la maniera fiamminga*, the German manner, *la maniera tedesca* or *todesca*, this being a style of architecture, as Vasari put it, founded by the Goths and thus to be avoided at all costs, “questa maniera fu trovata dai Goti . . . iddio scampi ogni paese dal venir tal pensiero” (VM 1: 138).

These categories helped Vasari lay out the general structure of his history. Yet in addition there was a more local way the term *maniera* was used, namely to speak of the personal styles of the artists in Vasari’s narrative. Here an early example of *maniera* was that of Cimabue who, so Vasari said, in his work passed beyond the manner of the masters who taught him, “la maniera de’ maestri che gli’ insegnavano” (VM 1: 249), leaving behind the Greek manner to reach the drawing and the method of the moderns, “al nuovo modo di disegnare e dipingere” (VM 1: 244). And so on, that Giotto, if first instructed by Cimabue, soon moved from that bad style to revive the modern and good art of painting, “che sbandì affato quella goffa maniera greca e risuscitò la moderna e buona arte della pittura” (VM 1: 372). And then, in this history of painting—and an equivalent pattern was laid out for sculpture and architecture—there
came Masaccio to whom we owe the new style of painting, “la maniera nuova della pittura” (VM 2: 288), and then finally Leonardo who introduced the third manner which, as Vasari put it, we might want to call the modern age, “il quale dando principio a quella terza maniera che noi vogliamo chiamare la moderna” (VM 4: 11). Even for Vasari this was a familiar story—in its first stages it was there in Leonardo’s notes—and in its assumptions it rested on an idea of style and succession found in the account by Dante, cited in Vasari, of the relationship between Cimabue and Giotto, that Cimabue was once famous but now his fame was supplanted by that of Giotto, “Credette Cimabue nella pintura / Tener lo campo, ed ora ha Giotto il grido / Sì che la fama di colui oscura” (Purgatorio 11.94-96; in VM 1: 256). The mechanics of this story could be filled out in greater detail by a range of other Humanist precepts, the idea of the pupil surpassing his master, the choices made in imitation, the decisions to follow a particular master, the prudence to follow one’s own disposition and not that of another. And the result, in the record Vasari made of each artist, could lead to the invention of a particular style, a very beautiful style, “una bellissima maniera” (VM 1: 294), as with Nicolò Pisano, a smooth style that everyone considered most beautiful, “egli avesse la maniera gentile, da ognuno tenuta bellissima” (VM 4: 339), as with Raphael, a good style, “una maniera buona” (VM 4: 461), as with Domenico Puligo, or then, at the other end, a dry and labored style, “la maniera secca e stentata” (VM 6: 458), as with the minor Ferrarese artist Domenico Panetti, or a dry style, full of profiles, “una maniera secca e piena di profili” (VM 2: 203), as with Paolo Uccello.

The story here, whatever the level of narrative, was essential for Vasari in his description of the formation and the historical record of the artists he wrote about. As he emphasized, at the most general level, the arts depended on an idea of design, a conception and judgment based, as he would say, both on the imitation of nature and the copying of other masters. And the result, a particular style or manner, was seen to be a decision based on the idea of choice, some artists choosing wisely, others foolishly. But the comments of the Reverend Gilpin sharpen our eyes to a problem not openly confronted by Vasari; that if an individual maniera is the result of a certain choice, of a clear intention, indeed as a sign also of a certain personal integrity and self-definition—this is how imitation was described by Petrarch and many after him—such a maniera, once so established, ran the danger of losing its moral authority and becoming nothing more a mere pattern of choices, or what a recent scholar, thinking of maniera could call a working method merely based on routine or
repetition. In rhetoric, spread as it is across time, there can be a certain value in the repetition in words or phrases, and indeed there were several now obscure terms in ancient rhetoric to describe the pattern of such persuasive practices. But not so for the visual arts, perhaps from what could be called the essentially synchronous nature of their visual language. At which point it was always crucial for Vasari to emphasize that if the style of a Giotto, a Masaccio, a Leonardo represented the record of a choice, recognizable by the varied sameness of its forms, such consistency of style, if once wisely chosen, did not fall into what might be seen as mere repetition. Such had been the case, as Vasari made clear many times, in those countless pieces of sculpture produced by the Byzantines, the many figures done by whichever artists in the same style, “ne fecero similmente infinite” (VM 1: 243), as he put it, seen in the figures above the door of San Michele, in the Piazza Pedella in Florence and in the Cathedral of Pisa or in Venice at St. Mark’s, figures in the same style, staring as if possessed, as he memorably put it, on the tips of their toes, “e così molte pitture, continuando, fecero di quella maniera, con occhi spiritati a mani aperte, in punta di piedi” (VM 1: 242).

The balance here in the idea of artistic production between moral consistency and repetition was a delicate one, equally grounded, we might say, equally in the idea of a consistency in personal identity. Such identity as an artistic idea had long been established within the accounts of the forms of rhetoric or poetry; that here is a Cicero, who is to be recognized consistently as Cicero, or then, to quote the rejoinder by Angelo Poliziano, that here is Angelo Poliziano who is to be recognized as not a Cicero. Much within the Humanism of the Renaissance was said of likeness or difference, of what is ours or what is alien to us, and what then was proper imitation or what was mere copying—here Petrarch, when speaking of the moral choices of style, would make the distinction between copying, *copiare* and imitating, *imitare*, such copying being the essential fault of the Scholastics. Yet there was no simple way to resolve the possible conflict between consistency and repetition, even if the copying was the copying of oneself and based on one’s temperament, education, and opportunity. Perhaps a way to side-step this question, acknowledging both individuality and consistency, was to call up a metaphor from handwriting, as did Vasari, comparing the various styles of artists to handwriting, noting that by long practice, as he says, they can be recognized by careful painters just as a good secretary recognizes the writings of colleagues and as everyone does of friends and relatives, “le varie maniere degli artefici, che si faccia un dotto e pratico cancelliere
i diversi a variati scritti d’ suoi eguali, e ciascuno i caratteri de’ suoi più stretti famigliari amici e congiunti” (VM 7: 727).

This might be enough to quiet the problem; and it gave Vasari, like the careful painters he mentions, an authority in his recognition of the styles of the individual artists. When we look at what he said of this question, we see he rarely noted anything of the problem of repetition, unless there were other moral questions raised or, as with medieval art, decrying it for this very reason, he wished to make a larger general historical point. Instead the accounts he made of the lives and works of artists were usually structured around a description of the formation of the style—sometimes adding a moral comment on the choices made—then to move on to a listing of the works produced by that artist that depended less on matters of style than of the rhetorical effectiveness of the image, of how the story was told and how the figures expressed the action. And here problems of repetition or sameness or variety did not need to be confronted.6

It was thus easy, with this vocabulary at hand, for Vasari to say that some mosaics by Andrea Tafi were crude and without design or art, no advance on the Greek style, “le quali tutte cose essendo goffe senza disegno e senz’arte, e non avendo in sè altro che la maniera greca di que’ tempi” (VM 1: 334). Or to suggest that the painter Ugolino, out of obstinacy, continued to work in the Greek style, following Cimabue rather than Giotto “per una certa sua caparbietà tenere piuttosto la maniera di Cimabue, che quella di Giotto” (VM 1: 454); that Giottino, hence his name, wisely chose to follow the style of Giotto rather than that of his father Stefano “esser imitatore della maniera di Giotto, piuttosto che quella di Stefano, suo padre” (VM I 622); that Masaccio, freed himself from the style of Giotto and brought in the modern style “levò in tutto la maniera di Giotto . . . e messe in luce quella maniera moderna . . . ” (VM 2: 106); that then the most graceful was Raphael who, having studied by the ancient and modern masters, selected the best qualities from all their works, “Ma più di tutti il graziosissimo Raffaello di Urbino; il quale studiando le fatiche de’ maestri vecchi e quelle de’ moderni, prese da tutti il meglio” (VM 4: 11); or, later in the history, that Girolamo da Carpi having seen a painting by Correggio was captivated by its style, as then he imitated many of Correggio’s pictures—and this seems to have been acceptable—acquiring his manner very strongly, “le quali tutte opere essendo state ritratte da Girolamo, furono cagione che egli migliorò tanto la sua prima maniera, che’ella non pareva più dessa, nè quella di prima” (VM 6: 471).
Yet always such imitation had to be tempered with judgment. It could be good, as when Vasari says that Desiderio da Settignano imitated the style of Donatello, treating his figures with grace and lightness, “fu costui imitatore della maniera di Donato, quantunque dalla natura avesse egli grazia grandissima e leggiadria nelle teste” (VM 3: 108). It might be less good, as when the Paduan sculptor Bartolommeo Bellano, in his response to Donatello, his master, inflamed by the praises bestowed on him—and we can sense a moral failure here—copied him so closely in his pieces that they appeared to be Donatello’s own and those who are not better informed, so Vasari noted, are continuously being deceived “s’ingegnò con tanto studio di contraffare la maniera e il fare di Donato . . . che non ha di ciò cognizione intera, ch’ella siano di Donato, se non sono avertiti, restano tutto giorno ingannati”, (VM 2: 604). And then occasionally there was the problem of repetition as when Vasari said of Paolo Uccello and of his study of perspective, such endless study leading to repetition—and this is what he seems to be saying—which clogs the mind with difficulties, turning a fertile and spontaneous talent into something sterile and labored, “e bene spesso di fertile e facile lo fa tornar sterile e difficile” (VM 2: 203). But the most explicit account he made of the danger of repetition appears in his account of Perugino, that he constantly repeated himself, giving his figures the same expression, in one instance—doing so perhaps out of avarice—so repeating the figures he had used before that even his friends declared he had not taken pains enough. Perugino’s response was one of surprise: “that you formerly praised these figures and if now they displease you how can I help it?” ‘e particolarmente perchè si era Pietro servito di quelle figure che altre volte era usato materie in opera . . . se ora vi dispiaccioso e non lodate, che ne posso?’ (VM 5: 586-87).

And now the implications of the comment of Constable, expressed in a lecture in 1836, the second in a series of four, at the Royal Institution in London, ones that can alert us to another aspect of the problems of style or maniera. *Maniera*, we might allow, if at one level about style as style, entails more, namely representation, or what Vasari spoke of, in a description of painting, as the imitation of nature and of all living things. And the closer one follows this, as did Masaccio, the more one could say that the artist was excellent “non essendo la pittura altro che un contrafar tutte le cose della natura vive . . .” (VM 2: 288). This possibility raises questions about the relationship of the work of art, in its *maniera*, in its stylistic whole, to what is there in the world beyond it. Speaking of this question and of what he called truth to nature, for him the first purpose of painting, Constable took note of a certain set of
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painters—he does not mind naming names—who substituted falsehood for truth and formed, as he put it, “a style mean and mechanical, by which they are then termed mannerists.” What Constable meant by truth in painting is a complex question, as has long been recognized, but it is clear that such an idea was for him based on an equivalence here to the processes of contemporary scientific investigations of someone like Gilbert White in his history of Selborne, published in 1798, or those, in 1815, of Thomas Foster on the taxonomy of clouds, theses plus also the idea of scientific method defined years earlier by Francis Bacon, re-popularized in England in those years. Indeed, Constable quoted a passage from Bacon’s *Advancement of Learning* in a lecture he gave on landscape painting. Vasari, by contrast, did not have to speak of an idea of truth, even if once, in the preface to the third section of *Le Vite* he could say that the masters of the second stage so nearly approached the truth that those who followed them were able to reach perfection “tanto almanco vicino al vero . . .” (VM 4: 7). But even here it is not clear what idea of truth he was speaking about and if, on occasion, he could speak of a truthful imitation of nature, even once noting a picture done with grace and very truthful imitation, “con una grazia ed imitazione verissima” (VM 4: 141), in fact this phrase is used to describe images of wood nymphs and Bacchantes by Piero di Cosimo which clearly did not refer to the nature Constable knew. There is truth, as we know, and there is truth. And if Constable spoke of painting as a science, an inquiry into the laws of nature, when, in an apparently similar move, Vasari spoke of Giotto as opening the door of truth, “aperse la porta della verità” (VM 1: 257) for him this referred to the idea that Giotto set painting once more on the right path, returning it to the rules of art—it was departure from them that had led to the decline of art after Pope Gregory—rather than to any more particular attention to the objects in the world. So too when he praised Leonardo for introducing the modern manner, which he achieved, so Vasari said, by his attention to rule, order, proportion, drawing, and divine grace, “così a punto come elle sono, con buona regola, miglior ordine, retta misura, disegno perfetto, e grazia divina” (VM IV 11), these allowing his figures both motion and breath. And this was realized, according to Vasari, as for all the artists in the modern manner, not by examining nature but by looking at certain antiquities, those mentioned by Pliny, which, so Vasari continued, exhibited sweetness and serenity, certain attitudes which involved no distortion of the whole figure but only a movement of certain parts, revealing a perfect grace, “le quali nella lor dolcezza e nelle lor asprezze, con termini carnosi e cavati dalle maggior bellezze del vivo, con certi atti che non in tutto si
storocono, ma si vanno in certe parti movendo, e si mostrano con una graziosissima grazia . . ." (VM 4: 10). It was not surprising that here Vasari attributed the final glory of art to a recognition of the wondrous classical statues. But in doing so he referred to elements grounded within the language of art than in any more general truths or any references, however phrased, to actual nature.

Here, to understand a fuller basis for Vasari’s language we might turn to the distinction that existed within Humanism between truth and verisimilitude, between veritas and verisimilitudo, such verisimilitude, as Quintilian noted, being the true aim of all rhetoric, even if it was illusion, even persuasion. For Constable such an idea no longer held meaning, for he was speaking after the scientific revolution of the 17th and 18th centuries, when it had become possible to define the activity of painting as an inductive process, that is to say moving, as induction does, from the particular to the general. Such a notion was acceptable, even if, as Bacon had, the model of scientific investigation, to which painting was comparable, depended on theory and thus essentially on the processes of deduction. For Vasari it was enough to say that the idea of the truth resided in traditions of practice, rightly reconstituted, however much or little such traditions were grounded in observation and the study of nature. Or rather, as Vasari put it, that if art depended at one level on the imitation of nature, it depended also, since it cannot reach its height unaided, by the imitation of the most excellent artists, “perché io so che l’arte nostra è tutta imitazione della natura principalmente e poi, perchè da sè non può salir tanto alto, delle cose che da quelli che miglior maestri di sè giudica sono condotte” (VM 1: 222). Representation, however focused on nature, would always be defined within traditions of maniera, even if as such—to come back to Constable—it might run the danger of becoming what he called mean and possibly mechanical, false rather than true. Interestingly Vasari does once use the adjective “mechanical” to describe and disparage the humble painting of escutcheons and the like that Girolamo da Carpi painted, “forzieri, scabelli, cornicioni . . . que’ lavori meccanici (VM 6: 470). In the end it was the beauty of the representation that counted, the way, for example, that Correggio painted hair, in a manner, as Vasari said, unknown before, soft and downy, in place of being hard and dry where such repetitiveness did not matter for what Correggio did, as Vasari noted, was clear and to be praised for its delicate vivacity, “sfilando i suoi capelli con un modo, non di quella maniera fine che facevano gli innanzi a lui, ch’era difficile, tagliente e secca, ma d’ una piumosità morbidi” (VM 4: 12). Interestingly, it can be added that, in his translation of Charles Du Fresnoy’s Treatise on
Painting, published in 1695, John Dryden could speak of mannerists—did he mean Correggio?—who represented five or six times in the same painting the same hairs of a head.

And yet, to come back to Perugino, Vasari could on occasion acknowledge the constraints that style might place on the truth of representation, as when, in a powerful and compact phrase, he spoke of Perugino reducing the theory of his craft to a style, “la dottrina . . . ridotta a maniera, ch’è faceva a tutte le figure un’aria medesima” (VM 3: 608). So too in what he says in a long passage about the sculptor Mino da Fiesole where he speaks of imitation as being the fixed art of doing what you must do to understand the most beautiful things of nature, that the imitation of nature is fixed—he is sure of that word—in the style of the artist whose long practice has become style, “perchè la imitazione della natura è ferma nella maniera di quello artifice. Che ha fatto la lunga pratica diventare maniera” (VM 3: 115). This raises a disconcerting conclusion; that it is not possible, however much one tries, to make works so similar to nature that they seem to be nature herself. What then is the answer? To study style and natural things together, as did Michelangelo, involving himself, as Vasari reminds us, in dissections until his stomach was too distressed for him to continue. Not everyone would agree that this was the solution for, whatever the fruits of such intrusive investigations, as the Venetian critic Ludovico Dolce could say in his dialogue L’Aretino, whoever has seen a single figure by Michelangelo has seen them all,” ‘E, per concluaderla, chi vede una sola figura di Michel’Agnolo, le vede tutte’ (Roskill 88-89) This is nature translated into maniera, a criticism of Michelangelo’s style, grounded at once in aesthetic and moral and even epistemological arguments. Earlier in this text Dolce had said more of repetition, that this was what children did, repeating the same thing over and over again, “è costume da fanciullo tornare a replicar molte volte una cosa” (Roskill 170-73). Vasari, of course, could never have said anything of the kind against Michelangelo.

Such is indeed a question all artists, at all periods, confront, however much or little the social and historical contexts in which they work take notice of it. And if we have been speaking of here so far of artists of a distant time, it is not difficult to see something of the problem spoken of more recently. Here I refer to two comments by the art critic Clement Greenberg, which, across the centuries, refer nicely to the very same artistic issues this study has been concerned with. The first is about the danger of mere repetitiousness; that when you have seen three of the
boxes of the artist Joseph Cornell, so Greenberg said, you have seen them all—a play on the usual remark that for works by a limited artist, it is enough that when you have seen one you have seen them all. The second is a comment Greenberg made about the much acknowledged remark of the Greek painter Apelles, “nulla dies sine linea,” no day without a line, no day without drawing, based on a passage in Pliny. No, said Greenberg; this may be true for a figurative artist but not for one working in a more abstract visual language. And why so? Perhaps because then there is an immense danger of the artists falling into a kind of repetitiousness—I am attaching this reason to his remark—as did, for him, Jackson Pollock in his later paintings. This brings us back to the comments of the Reverend Gilpin. The critical support Greenberg gave Pollock’s work stopped at his paintings after 1951. And in a painting, Blue Poles, done after that moment, when Pollock needed more works for an exhibition coming up at the Sidney Janis Gallery in New York he fell back, as is all too easy, on works he had already done, imposing on what he recognized as being a weak work the Blue Poles, stretching across the surface. A few weeks earlier Pollock had gone back to his studio to stare for hours at an earlier and successful painting, Lavender Mist, as if trying to find something there that was now gone. But according to Greenberg, he knew it was over, that for all his labor with this later picture, Blue Poles, it was not a success. Greenberg had said, speaking of Pollock that “all artists have their run and his ten years run was over.” And it was perhaps this problem—recognized on both sides—that led to their break up. And five years later Pollock was dead, killing himself and one of the two women who were with him, in a sad, drunken driving accident.10

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NOTES

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1 For this discussion of the term “style,” see generally Philip Sohm, Style in the Art Theory of Early Modern Italy, Cambridge UP, 2001; and for the idea of consuetudo in Humanist thought, see Brian P. Copenhaver and Charles B. Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy, Oxford UP, 1992, p. 214.
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2 For the appearance of the term “style” (stile), see Sohm 115-18, where he suggests it appears most usually in the art criticism of the 17th century; but note an earlier reference in Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo, Trattato dell’arte della pittura, Marchi & Bertolli, 1973, “che hanno tenuto diversa maniera e stile” (4.19).


4 For repetition as a rhetorical device, see Sohm 91, where he mentions the terms epanaphora, antistrophe, paromoiosis, epanalepsis, and pariosis. For repetition in the visual arts see Patricia L. Rubin, “Raphael and the Rhetoric of Art,” in Renaissance Rhetoric, edited by Peter Mack, Palgrave, 1994, pp. 165-82, where she speaks of such repetition in Raphael’s painting “Leo II Swearing an Oath before Charlemagne.” See, for an instance of verbal repetition in film, the narrative in Jean-Luc Godard’s film Ici et Ailleurs, as cited in Phillip Lopate, Totally Tenderly Tragically, Anchor Books, 1998, “Too simple and too easy to divide the world in two. Too easy to simply say that the wealthy are wrong and the poor are right. Too easy. Too easy and too simple. Too easy and too simple to divide the world in two” (294).

5 For Petrarch on imitation and copying and the Scholastics, see Streuver 145-46; and for Poliziano’s comment on himself and Cicero, made to Paolo Cortesi, see Ferruccio Ulivi, L’imitazione nella poetica del Rinascimento, Marzorati, 1959, p.17.


7 This remark by Constable, which appears in a longer session on Mannerism, is to be found in R. B. Beckett’s edition of John Constable’s Discourses, Suffolk Records Office, 1970, p. 57. Among the several artists he mentions as being guilty of this fault are Philips Wouwerman, Claude-Joseph Vernet, Francesco Zuccarelli, and Philip de Loutherberg.

8 For the idea of “verisimitude” and the citation from Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria (2.17.39), see Streuver 75-76, and note 92.

9 For this comment on hair, see Charles Alphonse Du Fresnoy, De arte grafica, translated by John Dryden, W. Rogers, 1695, p. 151.


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