The Kantian Liberal Peace (Revisited)

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Democratic peace studies have traditionally identified Kantian "republicanism" with procedural democracy and largely ignored liberalism and constitutionalism, which are even more fundamental for Kant's reasoning behind the liberal peace. A closer look into his major political works reveals that peaceful relations are expected from states with the protection of individual freedoms (liberalism), the rule of law and legal equality (constitutionalism), and representative government (democracy). Only when all three constitutive elements are jointly considered can we uncover the multifaceted nature of Kant's approach to the domestic sources of international peace. In this way, we not only find that monadic and dyadic expectations are consistent with Kant's theory, but also that both normative and interest-based explanations for international peace can equally draw on Kant as their theoretical precursor. We further demonstrate that it is plausible to infer that the Kantian legacy is related to civil peace as well. The propositions we derive from our theoretical reexamination of the Kantian legacy are strongly supported in our quantitative empirical test. Moreover, constitutional liberalism, rather than democracy, shows to be both more central for Kant's theory and empirically more robustly related to international as well as domestic peace.

It has been commonplace to identify the democratic peace research with the Kantian tradition, yet the main emphasis in this research is on the representative nature of electoral democratic institutions while largely ignoring the liberal elements of Kant's "republic" as a source of international peace. Like political theorists and Kantian scholars, we show that the respect for civil liberties and the rule of law—that is, liberal constitutionalism—represent even more fundamental elements of Kantian republicanism than procedural democratic institutions. While it is plausible to expect democracy and liberalism to be correlated, they are nevertheless theoretically and empirically distinct, and our reexamination of Kant's theory of the domestic sources for peace as well as our empirical analysis validate such a distinction.

Consider, for example, the recent rise of new regimes, which are not merely transitional, but are rather being consolidated as "competitive" or "electoral" autocracies (Levitsky and Way 2002) or "illiberal democracies" (Zakaria 1997). These prima facie pass as democracies, yet do not score as high on the criteria of liberal constitutionalism. Our study shows that it would be erroneous, and certainly inconsistent with Kant's political theory, to

conflate their external relations with liberal democracies simply because they share similar procedural institutions. Thus, when critics point to some conflicts such as that between Peru and Ecuador in the 1990s (e.g., Gates, Knutsen, and Moses 1996) as disputes that defy the democratic peace argument, our study shows that these are not necessarily disputes between liberal states (the cited conflict was actually between Fujimori's illiberal democracy and Ecuador's liberal state). This then reconfirms Kant's original penchant for civil liberties and rule of law as domestic solutions for peace.

We first revisit Kant's notion of republic to delineate its constitutive elements—civil liberties and the rule of law, separation of powers, and representative governance—and show how all three are essential for Kant's reasoning behind the "liberal peace." Secondly, unlike previous studies that associate Kant's original argument with either the monadic claim that liberal states are peaceful in general, or dyadic ("separate peace") explanations for the democratic peace, we show that either expectation is consistent with his theory. Thirdly, we point to several levels of explanations concerning domestic sources for peace in Kant's writings, which are based on his dual understanding of motivations behind human

actions—both moral and self-interested. This in turn means that, if we are to draw strictly from Kant, there are theoretical justifications for both norm-based and interest-based accounts for the democratic peace. Finally, we depart from the previous international relations literature that associates Kant's theory only with international peace and instead demonstrate that it is consistent with his theory to expect the decline in both international and civil wars with the rise of liberalism.

We derive several propositions from our discussion of Kant's approach to liberalism and peace, which are then tested quantitatively. Our results reinforce the need for a careful differentiation between liberal constitutionalism and democratic representation as two related but also distinct aspects of what is referred to as "liberal democracy." We find evidence for both monadic and dyadic expectations for the liberal peace, and the results are more robust when based on the measures for liberalism rather than procedural democracy. Our results for domestic ("civil") peace point even to the opposite pattern. Only liberal states experience less civil wars than any other type of regime. On the other hand, if the states are measured on a strictly democratic scale—regardless of their respect for civil liberties—they are in fact more vulnerable to civil wars than are autocracies. We draw important theoretical implications from these findings. Ultimately, besides the theoretical contribution to the Kantian studies of peace, our analysis validates the caution about the peaceful expectations from the current rise of "new democracies," many of which turn out to be semi- or illiberal societies with different conflict propensities than established liberal democracies.

Kantian Legacy

Our focus on domestic liberal constitutionalism, with its theoretical source in Kant's republic, does not by any means reflect a prioritization of Kant's first article of peace over the international and cosmopolitan sources of peace (second and third articles, respectively). Indeed, all three are inextricably tied to each other and equally contribute to peace (Jahn 2005, 193; Russett and Oneal 2001). In fact, according to the recent reinterpretation of Kant, the development of the rule of law at domestic and international levels does not have a sequential, but rather simultaneous, impact on international behavior (Cederman 2001, 16; Huntley 1995, 50). This reinterpretation has led some to switch from domestic to systemic sources of democratic peace (Cederman 2001; Huntley 1995; Mitchell, Gates, and Hegre 1999).

Russett and Oneal (2001) take a step further to simultaneously examine all three factors embodied in Kant's

articles of peace, i.e., democratic rule, the "pacific union" between democracies, and the cosmopolitan law emanating from economic interdependence. Doyle (1983, 2005), Keohane (1990), and Moravcsik (1997) carefully provide a theoretical outline of the "three pillars of liberalism" (Doyle 2005), each rooted in Kant's three articles for peace (i.e., domestic, international, and cosmopolitan). While they all acknowledge that these three conditions for peace are inextricably related and necessary for progress such as the Kantian one, each tilts toward one or the other as a prerequisite for the evolution toward global peace and cooperation (Moravcsik emphasizes the domestic element; Doyle emphasizes it too but in conjunction especially with Kant's second article; and Keohane is more interested in international institutions and commercial interdependence). Moreover, as shall be seen shortly, a correct reading of Kant should expect long-term historical progress through gradual evolutionary reforms, both domestic and international (Keohane 1990, 180; also Cederman 2001).

Therefore, rather than claiming the predominance of one factor over the other, we similarly acknowledge that all three Kantian requirements for peace are interlocked. Yet, despite the voluminous literature focusing on the first (domestic) "leg" in the Kantian "tripod," previous studies have mostly identified Kant's republic with procedural democracy and rather neglected his constitutionalist emphasis on individual liberties and the rule of law. Notwithstanding Doyle's (1983) initial study that emphasized liberal aspects in Kant's theory, a fuller treatment of the Kantian approach to liberalism and peace is much needed in both theoretical and empirical studies of "democratic peace." This need is further reinforced by the relevance of Kantian republicanism in his theory of peace. Namely, although the "pacific union" and "cosmopolitan law" are necessary requirements for liberal peace, they are ultimately contingent upon and generated by the presence and diffusion of republican (liberal) states. Thus the first article preconditions the effects of the second and third, which brings us back to the importance of a better understanding of Kant's reasoning behind the domestic sources of liberal peace.

"Republican Constitution"

Attracted by "his attempt to devise a political system that would protect human freedom at every level of interaction" (Ellis 2005, 13), Kant's political philosophy has received increased attention among political theorists only in recent times (Ellis 2005; Riley 1983; Rosen 1993; Williams 1983). On the other hand, an in-depth examination of Kant as a philosophical precursor to the

democratic peace has been rather cursory in the international relations studies (see articles by Bartelson 1995; Doyle 1983; Hinsley 1963, chapter 4; Huntley 1996; Jahn 2005; Waltz 1962; and Cavallar's book 1999), but most of these studies focus on his views on international institutions and/or norms ("third image"). Only Doyle (1983) and Cavallar (1999, chapter 4) provide a more detailed theoretical analysis of his link between *liberal* republicanism and peace.

As pointed out above, the tendency of democratic peace scholars and their critics is to routinely identify the Kantian "republic" with majoritarian rule in electoral democracy, which explains the prevalent use of Polity data in their studies. Yet, according to political theorists, civil liberties, legal equality, and the separation of powers are precisely at the heart of Kantian republicanism (Ellis 2005; Kersting 1992; Riley 1983; Rosen 1993; Williams 1983). We are thus left with an unusual discrepancy: Whereas international relations scholars tend to associate Kant's legacy with democratic institutions, political theorists emphasize his penchant for individual liberties and constitutionalism.[1] As Doyle (2005) correctly observes, the liberal elements of his republican idea as a prerequisite for peace have been unduly ignored in conflict studies.

To address this theoretical and empirical gap, we reconstruct the constitutive elements of the Kantian republic. While the representation of the general interest of people (as best achieved in electoral democracies) is an important element of the Kantian legacy, we argue that the core of his political thought also revolves around the idea of individual freedoms and the effects of their lawful protection on interactions *within* and *between* states. Our premise is that the republic that Kant holds as the first condition for peace rests on three essential ideas: the protection of individual freedoms (liberalism), the rule of law and legal equality (constitutionalism), and representative rule (as embodied, for example, in modern democracy).[2]

Representative Rule

Some critics of the liberal peace point out that Kant, in fact, "saw democracy as a form of tyranny" (Spiro

1994, 55; Gates, Knutsen, and Moses 1996, 6), citing Kant's warning in the first article for perpetual peace that "*democracy* in the strict sense of the word is necessarily a *despotism*" ([1795] 1996, 324). Yet a dismissal of Kant as a precursor to the democratic peace theory on these grounds would err on the substitution of modern electoral democracy for its plebiscitary form in the classical Greek sense which Kant actually had in mind (Cederman 2001, 16; Ellis 2005, 87–88; Huntley 1996, 48; Kersting 1992, 158; Riley 1983, 101; Rosen 1993, 34). The democracy that Kant accused of despotism is the one in which all citizens can exercise executive power, as would be the case in direct (plebiscitary) democracy. The separation of powers, as required for a republic, would thus be violated and lead to despotism.

This Aristotelian notion of self-governing democracy should not then be conflated with modern representative democracy, which is quite consistent with the Kantian republicanism. In fact, Kant was clear in his emphasis on the representation of the general will of people that makes the government republican in "spirit," if not always in form. Namely, for Kant, the question of who rules *[forma imperii]* is distinct from and subordinate to the question of "the way a people is governed by its head of state" [*forma regiminis*] ([1795] 1996, 324). The question that matters most to Kant is not who rules—he goes so far to note that even monarchy can be republican—but rather whether the policy reflects the general will of the people. Thus, for him, a democratic form of government is less relevant than the representative "spirit" of public policies, regardless of the type of the government body producing them. Though this is a common interpretation among a number of Kantian political theorists (e.g., Ellis 2005), democratic peace scholars instead stress the representative governmental forms and procedures.[3]

Civil Liberties and Legal Equality

The principles of civil liberties and legal equality of individuals provide the essential embodiment of what constitutes the First Definitive Article for perpetual peace:

> The civil constitution in every state shall be republican. A constitution established, first on principles of the *freedom* of the members of a society (as individuals), second on principles of the *dependence* of all upon a single common legislation (as

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[1] See Rosen's contention that "the principal value in Kant's political philosophy is freedom" (1993, 212; also Williams 1983, 128) or Ellis's recent praise that "Kant is rightly honored for his defense of human rights, the rule of law, and international peace" (2005, 13).

[2] Though similar to Doyle's liberal interpretation, our approach differs from his in some respects. Consistent with the arguments of most political theorists, we contend that only the public sphere is relevant for Kant's theory of the state and thus do not include the market economy as Doyle does. Besides the juridical equality and representation that we find in Doyle, we further include civil liberties and the separation of powers as indispensable components of his republic (see Doyle 1983, 212, 225–26).

[3] Ironically, the most controversial part in Kant's theory is his argument that all citizens are legally equal in their civil liberties, but unequal in their political rights to elect their representatives in the legislature. As Ellis (2005) and Kersting (1992, 154) rightly argue, this is simply an indefensible claim that is at odds with the rest of Kant's political theory.

subjects), and third on law of their *equality* (as citizens of a state) . . . —is a republican constitution. (Kant [1795] 1996, 322)

That these principles of individual freedoms, legal equality, and legitimate coercion through consent are central to Kant's republic is evident from the fact that he restates them throughout his political writings (e.g., [1793] 1996, 291; [1797] 1996, 455, 457–58).

The fundamental idea in his political theory is that individuals are morally autonomous in that they are free to set moral standards for their own actions. Since this "inner freedom" cannot be imposed on an individual, a "lawful" state does not have a normative function but rather a regulative one in coercing the citizens to reciprocally respect their rights in exercising "external freedoms." That is, individual external freedom—an independence from constraints imposed by other individuals—can be limited through lawful coercion by the state only if it conflicts with another individual's pursuit of her or his external freedom. Kant repeatedly showed his strong dislike for a "paternalistic" state that interferes into individual (inner) freedom of moral choice as "the greatest *despotism* thinkable" ([1793] 1996, 291; also, [1797] 1996, 460). Instead, all that is required from the government is to legislate and implement laws that would facilitate the maximization of civil liberties (external freedom) for all ([1793] 1996, 293, 290).

The principles of civil liberties and legal equality are closely intertwined in that the former is an externalized form of an individual's moral autonomy, which is the essence of humanity according to Kant, and the latter ensures their equal right to exercise their civil liberties "before the law" (Rosen 1993, 14, 26). Moreover, the republic's legal powers to maximize civil liberties while enforcing their equal distribution is legitimate since the citizens have consented at least virtually to the representation of their interests. Put simply, at the heart of the matter is not solely democracy but, even more importantly, the respect for civil liberties and the rule of law that distinguishes liberal from illiberal states. As a guarantee against political arbitrariness, the rule of law is most essentially manifested through the equal protection of civil liberties for all citizens. It is also reflected through Kant's notion of the separation of powers.

Separation of Powers

For Kant, the separation of powers does not provide for politico-legal checks and balances between the branches of government as it does for Montesquieu (Kersting 1992, 156). Instead, it delineates a coordinated division of government functions wherein the separate branches do not encroach on each other's boundaries. Kant's concern is that the representative character of legislative governance is not tainted by particular interests of the executive (Cavallar 1999, 20; Rosen 1993, 33; Williams 1983, 171). To this end, the separation of powers ensures that "the legislative authority must come from the people, however they are represented, rather than from the same source as the executive power" (Ellis 2005, 88). In this way, it provides for the legitimacy of governance "in which *law* itself rules and depends on no particular person" ([1797] 1996, 480–81). Otherwise there would be no constitutional restrictions on the arbitrary use of either legislative or executive powers. As with civil liberties, the key concern is with the rule of law and the representative "spirit" of governance.

Liberal Peace

As evident from the previous discussion, all three constitutive components of the republic are intertwined. They are also jointly relevant for understanding the logic behind Kantian liberal peace. We will now turn to a discussion of how all three "republican" elements can lead to both monadic and dyadic expectations concerning domestic liberalism and international peace.

Separate Peace (Dyadic Argument)

Since the republican governments are the only ones that respect the liberties and general interests of their own citizens, they are expected to recognize the individual rights and liberties of citizens in all republics. The fact that all republics are driven by the rule of law in their domestic governance facilitates their mutual trust in recognizing *all* citizens as morally autonomous individuals. As Mulholland notes, "There can be no rule of law and no peace unless states can be trusted to commit themselves to law . . . States, however, can be trusted only if they themselves manifest in their internal constitution that they are—at least in spirit—republican" (1990, 370). As a result, the recognition that other liberal republics share the same internal liberal and representative foundations provides the basis for the "separate peace" between liberal states. It also leads to, and is further reinforced by, their "pacific union" (second article)—an actual recognition of this shared set of norms that individual rights and liberties must not be violated between liberal states (though not necessarily having to be institutionalized)— as well as the "cosmopolitan law" (third article). At the same time, we should expect wars between liberal and

nonliberal societies (Doyle 1983, 230), since they do not share the same type of governance, especially regarding the differences in their respect for the rule of law. Consistent with Doyle's (1983) original interpretation, we can thus infer the "separate peace" proposition:

Proposition 1 (Separate Peace): *Liberal states are less likely to initiate conflict against other liberal states than they are against illiberal states.*

Note that the dependent variable in this and remaining propositions refers to conflict "initiation"—a correct reading of Kant would expect republics to defend themselves. In an oft-cited passage in *Perpetual Peace,* Kant is quite clear that the citizens of the republic should naturally "decide" not "to begin such a bad game" as war ([1795] 1996, 323) and "[i]n *Conflict,* he is careful to specify that republican governments would avoid aggressive wars, not defensive ones" (Ellis 2005, 231). It is also true that the state of war, including "unremitting military preparations . . . even in the midst of peace" ([1784] 1991, 47) generates fear, the remedy for which was Kant's primary concern. He saw the solution in institutional reforms toward the republican state (as well as international arrangements), because only under such a constitution is the sovereign accountable to the citizens, treating their ends as his rather than them as means to his ends. All of which makes him less inclined to prepare for unnecessary wars. As will be seen shortly, Kant views humans as driven by self-interest as well as moral maxims incompatible with war. Consequently, we should find much less of the "state of war" mindset in republics, especially when facing each other, due to their mutual trust that each is committed to protect civil liberties and represent their citizens' general interests. And, if treated as ends and not means by their "sovereigns," the citizens would be "hesitant" to support violent means for resolving disputes, unless necessary in self-defense.

While some argue that only normative (cultural) explanations yield "separate" or "dyadic" peace predictions (e.g., Gates, Knutsen, and Moses 1996, 4–5), others contend that these can follow from institutional models as well (Rousseau et al. 1996, 515). We do not find this debate as relevant in the context of Kant's political thought for the simple reason that his theory, as discussed above, rests on the premise that moral or cultural norms are strictly in the domain of individual internal freedoms. Since only individuals are moral agents in the public sphere, the public sphere is not itself a normative cultural phenomenon and "the (republican) state is not a moral institution per se" (Smith 1983, 626). If we are to use Kant as a source for understanding why republics should be peaceful, we need to look at his theory of citizens' preferences, that is,

whether they are driven by moral or self-interested motives. Of course, these matter only in liberal (republican) societies, since they are the only ones that translate these preferences into actual policies.

Kant's premises about citizens' preferences should lead us to both dyadic and monadic expectations about the peacefulness of republics. In this respect, note that the separate (dyadic) peace view can be compatible with the monadic argument about the peacefulness of liberal societies in general. The former simply compares the likely target of liberal states if initiation occurs at all. The latter compares conflict initiation by liberal states to that of illiberal ones, regardless of their targets. If we are to do the latter, then we should find ample evidence in Kant's reasoning about citizens' preferences for developing monadic argument as well.

Liberal Pacifism (Monadic Argument)

A monadic prospect for republics to be reluctant to fight any wars, regardless of the enemy's constitution, is rooted in Kant's notion that republics are the only true representative system of the general will and that the very nature of the human will is inconsistent with wars. At this point, he offers two levels of explanations of how human will, filtered through the republican representation, translates into peace. To adapt the international relations terminology, we will label them "normative" and "rationalist" accounts since they result from the duality in Kant's approach to human will in terms of moral motivations (Kant's term *Wille*) and self-interest (his term *Willkür*), respectively (see Beck [1965] 1993).

In the first sense, he argues that only the republic recognizes its citizens as morally autonomous individuals, meaning that they are free to act according to the convictions resulting from the "universal moral law." One of the most attractive Kantian formulations of the "universal law" is his humanity principle, which states that the humanity either in ourselves or others should not be treated as a means but as an end. Since war is in direct violation of such a principle, war is "the source of all evil and corruption of morals" ([1798] 1979, 155). For Kant, humans are subject to this and other principles emanating from the moral law since it is universal, that is, inscribed in the inner self of each individual. Human actions can put the moral law, including the maxim that there shall be no war (for its inconsistency with the humanity principle), into political practice, but only if there is a system of representation of the general will (expressing normative *Wille*) as is the case in republics. As a result, republican pacifism can be accounted for on normative (moral) grounds, and we can see how it can have a monadic effect.

Turning to Kant's second concept of human will (*Willkür*), we find self-interest as the driving force behind actions. Kant considers such self-interest in a material, amoral sense and its implications for international peace are best reflected in his oft-cited claim that "when the consent of the citizens of a state is required in order to decide whether there shall be war or not" they will be "hesitant" to begin it because of "all the hardships of war (such as themselves doing the fighting and paying the costs of war)" ([1795] 1996, 323).

As he does not specifically refer here to the enemy's regime type, some scholars understand primarily the monadic effects of such self-interested motivations to avoid the costs of fighting (Cavallar 1999, 76; Jahn 2005, 191). They might somewhat disagree whether any war is unacceptable as a costly lottery or, rather, only the wars whose costs outweigh the benefits of peace (for the latter, see Schweller 1992). Kant himself is never clear on this issue. Nevertheless, whether understood as the reluctance to embark on any wars, regardless of the status quo disadvantages, or only those that are costlier than peace, either view of Kant's account based on self-interested behavior holds monadically.[4] The core issue for the Kantian interpreters in this vein is that the target's regime type is not a criterion for fighting wars. Yet, as shown above, Kant's "self-interested" premise could be consistent with the dyadic expectation as well.

If we are to compare Kant's normative and rationalist approaches to motivations for liberal pacifism, his rationalist account rooted in "the war is costly" argument seems to be the most common interpretation of Kantian reasoning in the international relations literature (see, for example, Lake 1992, 28–29; Schultz 1999, 235–36; Spiro 1994, 52). Very rarely is he associated with the normative explanation (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993, 625). As we have shown, however, due to the duality in Kant's conception of human will—the duality he never successfully reconciles—it is reasonable to argue that both normative and rationalist accounts of liberal pacifism can claim him as their theoretical source. For this reason, while we agree in principle with Gates, Knutsen, and Moses (1996, 6) that the best way to resolve competing explanations of a particular phenomenon is to trace the causality behind it to its

philosophical origin, it is hardly applicable in Kant's case because of his dual and inconsistent approach to human motivations behind pacifism.

Whether the grounds for liberal pacifism are to be found in the spheres of individual morality or rather palpable gains—the issue we leave open to interpretations as it is beyond our scope and inconsequential for our purposes—it is crucial that these reflect individual *preferences* against war. This means that the institutions of freedoms and democratic procedures do not in themselves produce peace, but merely serve to translate public preferences into policies. Thus, based on Kant's arguments about citizens' preferences—regardless of whether formulated in normative or rationalist sense—we can derive the monadic expectation as follows:

Proposition 2 (Liberal Pacifism):   *Liberal states are less likely than illiberal states to initiate conflict against other states.*

As a general note, Kant consistently expected republics to avoid war. In his late work, *Conflict of the Faculties,* he argues that only the republican constitution is "created in such a way as to avoid, by its very nature, principles permitting offensive war" ([1798] 1979, 153). Here, he cites strictly moral reasons for why the republics avoid aggressive wars, that is, because "the same national constitution alone [is] just and morally good in itself." This evidently contrasts to his rationalist account in *Perpetual Peace.* In the end, therefore, both moral and self-interested grounds for the liberal peace can be found in Kant's writings.

Civil (Domestic) Peace

At this point, we go further to contend that it is quite consistent with Kant to expect liberal states not only to experience international peace, but domestic peace as well. Conventionally, the sole attention to the international liberal peace as the Kantian legacy might be attributed to the predominant use of his *Perpetual Peace* as the primary source on this subject. As we have shown, however, the link between republicanism and international peace cannot be fully understood without several other major political works, most importantly, *Rechtslehre* ([1797] 1996), *Theory and Practice* ([1793] 1996), *Universal History* ([1784] 1991), and *The Conflict of the Faculties* ([1798] 1979). We contend that his advocacy for the rule of law and civil liberties also has *implications* for his views on domestic violence.

It is consistent with Kant to talk about the pacific domestic effects of republicanism on two grounds: (1) his gradualism in advancing the theory of progress and

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[4]Unlike international relations scholars, who interpret this argument as a cost-benefit calculation, political theorists point out that Kant resorts to teleology or "a hidden plan of nature" ([1784] 1991, 50) to solve the puzzle of how self-interested motivations "even in the nation of devils" can bring on collective good such as international peace. As Ellis points out, however, Kant's "teleological claims are among his weakest arguments" that pale in comparison to "far better, agency-centered accounts of politics" (2005, 233). Our derivation of what we call Kant's rationalist and normative accounts are premised on the agency-based aspects of his theory.

(2) his own argument about the contradictory nature of civil violence in republics. The "gradual" transition toward an ideal state through reforms is a classic element of Kant's philosophy with critical implications for our expectations concerning liberalism and domestic peace. If we were to develop our expectations in the Kantian tradition, we should predict such transitions to be nonviolent, both externally and internally.[5] The spread of "democracies" through force would be incompatible with Kant's view that republican constitutions should rather be developed through a gradual process of domestic reform. Although the actual ("phenomenal") republics in the empirical world can never become ideal states ("noumenal" republics), they can nevertheless closely approximate ideal republics through gradual institutional evolution (Cavallar 1999, 78; Ellis 2005, 33–34).[6]

Moreover, Kant directly prohibits legal and moral foundations for civil violence in established liberal societies for the reason that goes to the core of the representative nature of liberal governance. As he contends, it would be self-contradictory for the citizens to rise against the government that serves their interests, because by rising against the system in which the people become sovereign through their representatives, they would deny themselves their own sovereign powers ([1797] 1996, 463). This is not to say that there is no place for public criticism and even passive resistance—in fact, for Kant, the freedom of the "pen" and critical expressions against government policies are the driving force behind political reforms and institutional progress of republics. Yet, a state cannot be republican unless its policy is respectful of individual liberties and genuinely representative of its citizens' interests. Otherwise, it would be despotic. If citizens risk the existence of such a state through violent actions, they would act against their interests. Hence, following Kant's claim concerning the "self-contradiction" in people's rise against their own interests, internal violence against the constitutional liberal governance is unlikely.

Proposition 3 (Civil Peace): *Liberal states are less likely to experience domestic violence than illiberal states.*

[5]Kant's opposition to an external imposition of governments is clearly stated in his Preliminary Article 5 against forcible interference in domestic affairs, and Preliminary Article 2 regarding peaceful acquisition of another state ([1795] 1996). Thus imperial wars involving liberal democracies would be entirely inconsistent with Kant's theory and political beliefs.

[6]Kant actually oscillated between a conservative antirevolutionary stance and the acknowledgment that revolutions might help autocracies toward progress. In his last major political writing *The Conflict of the Faculties,* for example, he takes both positions with his famous enthusiasm for the French Revolution and yet, in his theory of republic and peace, he restates his gradualism ([1798] 1979, 165, 167).

Let us be clear at this point that we are *inferring* from Kant's theory that violent means for resolving domestic conflicts are unlikely under republican constitutions. Political theorists agree that Kant's position on revolutions is ambivalent, though there is deep disagreement on its significance. Since he advocates gradual reforms, he is held by some to be a staunch conservative. Others point to his public sympathy for the American and particularly the French revolutions, concluding that he should be hailed as "the philosophical champion of the ideas of 1776 and 1789" (Reiss 1956, 179). This is not the place to resolve this long-standing issue. Our main argument, instead, is that we can validly infer the proposition about liberal civil peace from his theory. His quoted argument about the self-contradictory nature of rebelling against the government assumes the existence of the "public sphere," including the right of the citizenry to express their views and criticism. It is precisely the existence of such a public sphere and "the freedom of the pen" that provides the mechanism for progress through gradual reforms (Ellis 2005; Habermas 1997; Reiss 1956). Publicity for Kant was a condition of progress toward republican governance; he did not anticipate modern autocracies that lack such a public sphere.

Another question that may validly be raised concerns the fact that civil wars of modern times take on various manifestations, including ideological, ethnic, and other dimensions. We cannot impute a theory of such diverse forms of civil conflicts to Kant; but it is valid to conclude from his theory that violent means for resolving domestic issues should be less likely under liberal republics than under those with poor record for individual rights and liberties. This inference directly follows from Kant's notion of republic as well as his both normative and rationalist accounts of why citizens, if free as in the republics, would be reluctant to use forceful means to pursue their ends, including domestic ones.[7]

Research Design and Data

Our propositions inferred from Kant's political theory point to the impact of liberalism on both international and domestic peace. Hence we estimate two separate models—an international and domestic conflict model. To compare the effect of liberalism on peace to that of electoral

[7]We do not claim to use Kantian theory to elucidate the roots of ethnic conflicts as one of many types of civil wars. However, it is illustrative in the context of this discussion to contrast the cases of the peaceful constitutional resolution of the status of Quebec to violent dissolutions and/or cessations of previously illiberal regimes such as the former Yugoslav republics.

democracy, we use measures of civil liberties and procedural democracy separately. While these two explanatory variables will remain the same in both models, the unit of analysis, dependent variables, and control variables are sufficiently different to warrant their separate description.

International Conflict Model

Unit of Analysis and Dependent Variable. The unit of analysis should reflect the fact that our hypotheses stipulate not only a low probability for liberal states to initiate conflict in general (a monadic argument) but also against other liberal states (a dyadic expectation). Following Rousseau et al. (1999) and Bennett and Stam (2000), we use directed dyads as the proper unit of analysis for testing both monadic and dyadic arguments in the same analysis. More precisely, since states are identified as initiators and targets in directed dyads, we can test dyadic arguments by constructing an independent variable that specifies the target type, and thus, examine whether the potential initiator is likely to issue a threat against an opponent of a particular regime type. At the same time, we can also test a monadic position as to whether liberal states are likely to initiate disputes regardless of the opponent's regime type, by explicitly identifying disputes with liberal and illiberal targets, and then comparing the dispute initiation against each. In this way, we can directly test whether the opponent's regime type is relevant.[8]

As commonly done in the studies of international conflict (see Bennett and Stam 2000; Lemke and Reed 2001), we analyze politically relevant directed dyads. Since many influential empirical analyses of democratic peace (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett and Oneal 2001) use relevant dyads (PRDs), the results of our analysis can be comparable to theirs as well. Moreover, as Maoz and Russett (1993, 627) originally made the persuasive case, these dyads have the opportunity to interact, because they are either contiguous or involve a major power with a global reach, and are consequently expected to be more likely involved in conflict.[9] Since we use the Freedom House data (Gastil 1990) as the best available data source

for measuring civil liberties, this necessarily restricts our analysis to the period beginning in 1972 (the first year for which these data are available) and ending in 2000. A test of Kant's theory of progress should ideally cover a long time span expanding over several epochs, but it would do injustice to his theory of republic to use indicators for the procedural democratic institutions, such as Polity, as a substitute for the legal guarantees for civil rights and the rule of law, which are at the heart of his republic.[10]

Consistent with our propositions, we use *militarized dispute initiation* as the principle dependent variable. It is dichotomous, coded one when the potential challenger in a dyad was the first to initiate the conflict against an opponent, and zero otherwise. We use the Militarized Interstate Disputes data (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004) as our source for foreign conflicts.[11]

Independent Variables. Consistent with our theoretical discussion and hypotheses, the notion of liberalism should be at the heart of our explanatory framework.

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[8]Monadic analyses using the nation-year as the unit of analysis cannot explicitly rule out a potentially dyadic version of the democratic peace as they do not specify the target's regime type. Nevertheless, we did test the monadic argument with the nation-year (monad) as the unit of analysis with an event count model and the results are consistent with those reported here.

[9]This indeed shows to be the case with our sample, as the probability of MIDs occurring is nearly 10 times higher among PRDs than for all dyads during the observed period, while, at the same time, the sample size is reduced by over 10 times, thus reducing a great number of "irrelevant" dyads for our analysis. This sample restriction to PRDs should not cause concerns for measurement

error or selection bias, because, as Lemke and Reed report in their extensive analysis of PRDs, even if there is evidence of either, they "find little or no evidence that such error or bias leads to erroneous estimation" (2001, 140) when a sample is restricted to PRDs.

[10]An anonymous reviewer suggests we increase our time span by replacing the civil liberties variable with a Polity component if any displays high correlation with civil liberties. We have not found any Polity component being highly correlated with the Freedom House measure for the observed period (the highest correlation coefficient was .213). Most importantly, in their presentation of Polity indicators, Jaggers and Gurr are explicit that the Polity dataset excludes measures for civil liberties, indicating that, due to the historical paucity of "data on civil liberties, we have not attempted to single out, and then quantify, this dimension of democracy. Instead, we focus on the 'institutional' dimensions of democracy" (1995, 471). Given our argument that the Kantian notion of constitutional liberalism is conceptually distinct from the institutional democracy as measured by Polity, it would thus raise a measurement validity problem for our analysis to use any component of the latter as a proxy indicator for the former.

[11]Like Russett and Oneal (2001, 94–96), we use MIDs as a measure of conflict since wars are rare events. In our test, MIDs prove to be valid indicators of conflicts with some degree of violence, because in our sample there were no disputes limited to verbal threats only. This is also consistent with the general pattern of MIDs as reported in Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer (2004, 150). As for initiators, MID data operationalize them as "the first states to take codable military action," which by no means indicate their "responsibility" for conflict (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004, 138, 139). Such coding is quite consistent with Kant's argument that republics should not be the first to use military options, verbal or actual, as a means for settling disputes. Namely, as repeated with careful precision in several of his works (as cited above), Kant not only argues that republics are unlikely to wage wars of aggression, but also not even to "prepare" for military confrontations or consider violent means to avert aggression. In other words, any forms of militarized actions should not be expected from the republics unless directly attacked.

Civil Liberties. To measure our key explanatory variable—liberalism—we rely on the Freedom House Comparative Survey of Freedom (Gastil 1990). It is based on a checklist of standard and highly inclusive elements that are typically considered to constitute individual freedoms, such as "freedom of expression and belief," the "rule of law" (i.e., an independent judiciary, protection from political terror and unjustified imprisonment), "associational and organizational rights," and "personal autonomy and individual freedom" (Gastil 1990, 36–40). According to each component, states are ranked on an ordinal scale ranging from one (the highest level of respect for citizens' civil liberties) to seven (the lowest level). Using this ordinal scale, Gastil (1990) further differentiates between free (those with a score of 1 or 2), partly free (a score of 3, 4, or 5) and unfree (a score of 6 or 7) states.

The Freedom House distinction between liberal, semiliberal, and illiberal states forms the basis for our measures of civil liberties. Specifically, we create three dyadic measures indicating whether the potential initiator, target, or both are liberal states. The first dichotomous variable, *liberal initiator-illiberal target* takes a value of one when the potential initiator in the dyad is a liberal state (a score of 1 or 2 on the Freedom House civil liberties measure), and the potential target is illiberal (a score greater than 2). The second dichotomous measure, *liberal initiator-liberal target*, takes a value of one when both the initiator and target are liberal states, and zero otherwise. The third variable, *illiberal initiator-liberal target* is coded one when the initiator is illiberal, and the target is a liberal state.[12]

Democracy. To determine whether the political system is characterized by institutionalized democracy, we use the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). In this way, a comparison can be made between our results and those reported in previous democratic peace studies, which have routinely used Polity to measure democracy (Cederman 2001; Maoz and Russett 1993; Mitchell, Gates, and Hegre 1999; Rousseau et. al. 1996; Russett and Oneal 1997). Our analysis is additionally informative in showing whether the inclusion of civil liberties accounts for any differences in the results. The Polity score ranges from -11

to $+11$, and we use the cutoff points suggested by Jaggers and Gurr (1995, 474) to classify states as autocracies (Polity score of -7 or less), anocracies (between -6 and $+6$), and democracies (greater than $+6$). Following this distinction between democracies and other regimes, we construct measures for regime type that are analogous to our measures for liberalism. That is, we create three dyadic measures indicating whether the potential initiator, target, or both are democracies.[13]

Liberal Democracy. To estimate a combined effect of liberal democracy, and the extent to which it is consistent with the results when each is estimated separately, we integrate liberalism and democracy into a single variable. To this end, we interact their scores into a single measure, coded one if a state is both liberal and democratic, and zero otherwise. We then create dyadic variables analogous to the dyadic measures for *civil liberties* and *democracy* as described above.

Control Variables. We also control for a number of exogenous factors which are typically suspected to have a potentially confounding influence in this research area. Relative power and alliance ties would be a standard realist response to liberal peace models (Farber and Gowa 1995). To control for the impact of *alliance ties* between the initiator and target, we use a dichotomous version of the Correlates of War (COW) alliance variable. It is coded one when the two states in a dyad are allied with one another and zero otherwise.

To measure the influence of the relative power between the initiator and target, we include the continuous variable *power parity* that ranges from zero, indicating a larger distance from parity, to one, indicating exact power parity. The data for the initiator and target's power are based on the COW composite index of national capabilities.

We also control for the "weak link" hypothesis in the economic interdependence literature that the less dependent state "has greater freedom to initiate conflict" (Russett and Oneal 2001, 142). We first create a standard measure of trade dependence between the initiator and target as the ratio of total trade (exports + imports) to GDP. Based on this measure, scholars typically include the lower of the two dependence scores to test the weak link hypothesis. This common practice, however, does not reveal whether it is the initiator or target that is more dependent on dyadic trade. We correct for this by interacting this standard measure with a dummy variable, coded one

[12]We have no specific hypotheses about the likelihood of liberal states to be targeted by illiberal states as it is irrelevant for interpreting Kant's theory. Rather, we include it for ease of interpretation of the results. With four possible dichotomous categories of the independent variable, it is necessary to exclude one in order to avoid perfect multicollinearity. We chose to exclude illiberal dyads, and the coefficients for the remaining three variables are then interpreted in terms of the probability of dispute initiation relative to this excluded category.

[13]There is only a moderate correlation between the liberalism and Polity scores for initiators ($r = .681$), which is consistent with our premise that they are not synonymous per se.

if the initiator is the dependent member in the dyad. The variable *initiator's higher dependence on dyadic trade* is continuous, with higher values indicating the initiator's greater dependence on trade with the target.

Lastly, to control for a possible influence of the spread of democracy, we include a variable indicating the proportion of *other democratic countries in the initiator's region*. It is measured as the ratio of democracies in the initiator's region to the total number of regional states. Regions are identified according to the COW. We opt for region rather than the entire international system because if there is any systemic effect of democratization, it should be more immediate and stronger in neighboring and geographically proximate areas.

Statistical Model. Due to the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable, we estimate international dispute initiation with logistic regression. To account for potential temporal dependence in the sample, we use the correction procedure that includes a continuous measure for the number of years the dyad has been at peace (*peace years)*, and a cubic spline function with three internal knots (see Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). We further control for within-dyad heteroskedasticity by estimating robust standard errors clustered on the dyad.

Domestic Conflict Model

Unit of Analysis and Dependent Variables. For our models of domestic conflict, we use the updated version of Sambanis's (2004) civil war data set. The only appropriate unit of analysis in this case is the nation-year, and we analyze all states for the period 1972–99. Consistent with the rest of the civil war studies, we code two dichotomous dependent variables. *Civil war onset* takes a value of one in the first year that a state experiences civil war according to Sambanis's (2004, 829–830) criteria, and zero for all other years. *Civil war prevalence* is also dichotomous, coded one for all years when a state is actively engaged in a civil war (i.e., throughout its duration) and zero for those years when not experiencing civil conflict.

Independent Variables. Our measures of liberalism and democracy are analogous to those in our model of international conflict. The only exception is that we do not include dyadic measures (liberal and democratic dyads) since domestic conflict is internal and thus cannot be treated as an externally dyadic event. The independent variable *liberal state* takes a value of one for states with a score of one or two on the Freedom House measure of civil liberties and zero otherwise, whereas the variable *democratic state* is coded one if its Polity score is greater

than +6 and zero otherwise.[14] We also include the interaction term *liberal democracy*, which takes a value of one when the state is both liberal and democratic and zero otherwise.

Control Variables. For our results to be comparable to previous studies, we include control variables that are the same covariates analyzed by Sambanis (2004; see similar models by Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003) and lag all variables to ensure that the results are not driven by endogeneity. We include the following: *GDP* and *economic growth*—the latter as the percentage change in GDP from period t−1 to period t; *political instability* as a binary variable, coded one if the state's Polity score decreased from the previous year by 2 or more points (i.e., from period t−1 to period t) and zero if it did not; *oil exporter* is also dichotomous, coded one if the state's oil exports were greater than one-third of its total exports and zero otherwise; *ethnic fractionalization* is a continuous variable, constructed by Fearon and Laitin (2003), measured as the proportion that the largest ethnic group takes in the population; *terrain*, as the proportion of the country that is mountainous, is also a continuous variable, as is the measure of the country's *percentage Muslim*, typically included to control for the "clash of civilizations" argument; and, finally, the natural log of the state's population and the number of years that have elapsed since the state was last engaged in a civil war (i.e., *peace duration*).

Statistical Model. Since both dependent variables—civil war onset and prevalence—are dichotomous, we estimate our models with logistic regression. We also control for potential within-state heteroskedasticity by estimating robust standard errors clustered on the country.

Empirical Analysis

We begin our empirical analysis with descriptive insights into our distinction between liberal and democratic states regarding their conflict behavior. Table 1 shows the frequency distribution of international and civil conflicts among different states according to their regime characteristics, and the chi-square is statistically significant. As intuitively expected, most liberal states are democracies, and most illiberal states are autocracies (see columns for PRDs and nation-years). More interestingly, semiliberal states can be as democratic as autocratic

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[14]As was the case in the international conflict model, the two variables for liberal and democratic states are only moderately correlated ($r = .540$).

TABLE 1   Frequency Distribution of International Dispute Initiation and Civil War Onset

	International Disputes		Civil Wars	
	PRD (Percentage of Total)	MID (Percentage of Total)	Nation-years (Percentage of Total)	Civil War Onset (Percentage of Total)
Liberal State				
Democracy	21433 (49.23%)	120 (17.09%)	909 (28.06%)	1 (1.56%)
Anocracy	121 (0.28)	2 (0.28)	45 (1.39)	0 (0.00)
Autocracy	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)	0 (0.00)
Semiliberal State				
Democracy	2157 (4.95)	94 (13.39)	294 (9.08)	9 (14.06)
Anocracy	5431 (12.47)	134 (19.09)	644 (19.88)	24 (37.50)
Autocracy	1618 (3.72)	47 (6.70)	468 (14.45)	8 (12.50)
Illiberal State				
Democracy	65 (0.15)	0 (0.00)	1 (0.00)	0 (0.00)
Anocracy	879 (2.02)	62 (8.83)	70 (2.16)	7 (10.94)
Autocracy	11834 (27.18)	243 (34.62)	808 (24.95)	15 (23.44)
Total N	43538 (100.00)	702 (100.00)	3239 (100.00)	64 (100.00)
χ^2 (df)	473.83 (7)***		52.75 (7)***	

Note: PRD = Politically Relevant Dyad. MID = Militarized Interstate Dispute.

with a somewhat higher frequency only among anocracies. When put together, these results indicate that about one-fourth of democracies cannot pass the standards for fully liberal states (compare 294 nation-years for semi- or illiberal democracies to 909 nation-years for liberal democracies).

Recent scholarship in comparative politics has analyzed such societies as "hybrid regimes" due to their mixed record concerning civil liberties and the rule of law, but masked behind the procedural institutions of electoral democracy (e.g., Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002). Indeed, regimes such as Haiti or Paraguay in the 1990s, Taiwan in the 1990s, or Ukraine in the last 15 years, have all been identified as "hybrid" or "electoral authoritarian" (Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2002).

Their scores in our analysis place most of them into the nonliberal group of democracies as well.[15] Had we not discriminated among democracies according to their constitutional liberalism record (i.e., Freedom House index), we would have placed "hybrid" systems (say, Ukraine under Kravchuk and Kuchma) and liberal democracies (say, Switzerland) into the same category. Collapsing such diverse systems into the same group under the banner of procedural democracy would be inconsistent with Kant's "republicanism" and would confound our understanding of their potentially divergent conflict propensities.

[15] Some well-researched cases of competitive authoritarianism score as semi- or illiberal anocracies. Illustrative cases include "post-Autoglope" Fujimori's Peru (1992–2000) and Mexico in the 1990s (Levitsky and Way 2002 and Schedler 2002, respectively).

Table 1 already suggests that the distinction between liberal and democratic states, including their subtypes, can help us uncover some important differences in their external relations as well as domestic violence. Whereas liberal democracies comprise just under one-half of PRDs (49.23%), their share of total militarized interstate disputes is only 17.09%, as we would expect according to the monadic democratic peace argument. On the other hand, semiliberal democracies show the reverse trend, with an increased probability of involvement in MIDs: They make up only about 5% of PRDs but their share of MIDs increases drastically to close to 14%.

Table 2 presents the results from the logit analysis of international dispute initiation, and Table 3 shows predicted probabilities derived from the logit estimates in Table 2. As shown in the first model in Table 2, we find that liberalism has a negative and statistically significant influence on the probability of conflict initiation. Firstly, liberal initiators are less likely to initiate disputes than are illiberal states. The negative and statistically significant coefficients for both *liberal initiator-liberal target* and *liberal initiator-illiberal target* variables, when interpreted relative to the excluded category, indicate that dispute initiation is less likely among dyads with a liberal initiator as compared to the probability among illiberal dyads. At the same time, the positive and statistically significant coefficient for the variable *illiberal initiator-liberal target* points to the opposite relationship. There is an increased probability of dispute initiation when an illiberal initiator is facing a liberal rather than an illiberal target. Taken together, these two sets of results point to a monadic relationship between liberalism and conflict if we are to compare liberal initiators to illiberal ones, regardless of the opponent's regime type. Simply put, if illiberal initiators are more likely to initiate disputes against liberal states than they are against illiberal opponents, but liberal states are less likely to initiate against either liberal or illiberal opponents, then liberal states must be less likely to initiate disputes in general than are illiberal states.

For establishing the dyadic relationship between liberalism and peace, it is necessary to explicitly test whether the probability of initiation varies for liberal states depending on their opponent's regime type. We therefore need to compare the coefficients for *liberal initiator-illiberal target* and *liberal initiator-liberal target* to determine if they are statistically distinguishable, and, if so, whether one has a stronger impact on reducing the likelihood of initiation relative to the other. To this end, we ran a post-estimation test of coefficient equality, wherein a statistically significant test coefficient should indicate that there is a stronger effect on decreasing the likelihood of initiation against one type of opponent as opposed to

the other. The results show that the two coefficients are not equal (χ^2 13.05, $p = 0.000$), and that, when comparing the initiatory behavior of liberal states, it is necessary to also consider the regime type of their opponents.[16] Table 3 compares the substantive significance to see whether the monadic or dyadic effect is stronger, and we find it to be greater for the latter.

Note that the probabilities of initiation are low in Table 3 because the overall probability for MID occurrence among all politically relevant dyads is low as well (only 1.04% of all PRDs became militarized disputes). The predicted probabilities should thus be considered relative to the overall low probability of dispute initiation rather than to infer incorrectly that the overall substantive significance for the observed variables is weak (see also Russett and Oneal 2001). From Table 3, we can clearly discern that liberal states are about four times less likely to initiate disputes against other liberal regimes than they are against illiberal ones. Ultimately, therefore, when simply comparing liberal initiators to illiberal ones, the former have a significantly lower probability of conflict initiation than the latter. At the same time, it is also not possible to rule out a dyadic relationship between liberalism and peace due to the variation in the initiatory behavior of liberal states depending on whether they are facing liberal or illiberal opponents.

Moving back to Table 2, we find the same negative and statistically significant coefficient for democratic dyads. The coefficient for *democratic initiator-nondemocratic target,* however, fails to reach statistical significance, suggesting that the "democratic peace" may strictly be a dyadic phenomenon. Furthermore, if we look only at liberal democracies (Model 3), the findings are strikingly similar to the results of our liberalism model (Model 1), though not with those in the democracy model (Model 2). This indicates that, if democracies are more peaceful in general than nondemocracies, this relationship only holds among their liberal types.

As shown in Table 3, the coefficients for the democratic model are less substantively significant than those for the liberal model alone. The predicted probabilities of conflict initiation in columns 1 and 3 reveal that liberal initiators are much less likely to initiate conflict (0.63 against illiberal targets and .15 against liberal ones, relative to 1.53 baseline category of illiberal dyads) than democracies (0.88 against nondemocratic targets and 0.56 against

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[16]We also reanalyzed a model in which *liberal initiator-liberal target* was the excluded category. The coefficient for the variable *liberal initiator-illiberal target* was positive and statistically significant, indicating that liberal states are indeed more likely to initiate disputes against illiberal than liberal states, also pointing in the direction of a dyadic relationship.

TABLE 2   Directed Dyadic Models of Militarized Dispute Initiation, Logit Estimates

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Liberal Initiator-Illiberal Target	−.889*** (.197)	—	—	—
Liberal Initiator-Liberal Target	−2.303*** (.382)	—	—	—
Illiberal Initiator-Liberal Target	.273* (.187)	—	—	—
Democratic Initiator-Nondemocratic Target	—	−.266 (.214)	—	—
Democratic Initiator-Democratic Target	—	−.726*** (.312)	—	—
Nondemocratic Initiator-Democratic Target	—	.466*** (.178)	—	—
Liberal Democratic Initiator-Illiberal Nondemocratic Target	—	—	−.660*** (.195)	−.824*** (.198)
Liberal Democratic Initiator-Liberal Democratic Target	—	—	−2.202*** (.395)	−2.305*** (.397)
Illiberal Nondemocratic Initiator-Liberal Democratic Target	—	—	.280* (.183)	.190 (.205)
Alliance Ties	.008 (.151)	.065 (.154)	.032 (.150)	.347*** (.148)
Power Parity	1.673*** (.194)	1.788*** (.193)	1.720*** (.196)	—
Initiator's Higher Dependence on Dyadic Trade	.181 (.295)	−.620 (4.182)	.689 (3.983)	.633 (3.453)
Other Democratic Countries in Initiator's Region (proportion of total states)	−.088 (.295)	−.555* (.405)	−.344 (.277)	−.884*** (.303)
Constant	−1.468*** (.168)	−1.409*** (.168)	−1.421*** (.170)	−2.319*** (.171)
N	41700	41700	41700	41700
Log-Likelihood	−3002.118	−3056.934	−3022.739	−3112.024
Model χ^2	506.19***	538.86***	494.44***	366.80***

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. $^*p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$ (one-tailed *t*-tests).

To conserve space, the peace years variable and cubic splines are not reported. In all cases, the peace years variable is negative and statistically significant while the cubic splines are statistically insignificant, indicating that our results could have only partly been influenced by temporal dependence had we not included peace years. Their inclusion removed any possible bias in parameter estimates caused by temporal dependence.

democratic targets in comparison to 1.15 baseline category of nondemocratic dyads). In other words, liberal dyads are roughly 10 times less likely to experience conflict than illiberal dyads; on the other hand, democratic dyads are only two times less likely to have conflict than nondemocratic dyads. The reported changes in predicted probabilities again indicate a greater substantive significance for the regime coefficients in the liberal model alone

TABLE 3   Predicted Probabilities of Militarized Dispute Initiation

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	p	*Change*	*p*	*Change*	*p*	*Change*
Baseline Probability: All regime variables (democracy, liberalism, liberal democracy) set at zero; allies set to zero; power parity, trade, and percentage of other democratic countries in the region set at their mean values.	1.53		1.15		1.34	
Increase Liberal-Illiberal Dyad from 0 to 1	0.63	−0.9	—	—	—	—
Increase Liberal-Liberal Dyad from 0 to 1	0.15	**−1.38**	—	—	—	—
Increase Democratic-Nondemocratic Dyad from 0 to 1	—	—	0.88	−0.27	—	—
Increase Democratic-Democratic Dyad from 0 to 1	—	—	0.56	**−0.59**	—	—
Increase Liberal Democratic-Illiberal Nondemocratic Dyad from 0 to 1	—	—	—	—	0.70	−0.64
Increase Liberal Democratic-Liberal Democratic Dyad from 0 to 1	—	—	—	—	0.15	**−1.19**
Increase Power Parity from $\frac{1}{2}$ standard deviation below the mean to $\frac{1}{2}$ standard deviation above the mean	2.79	+1.26	2.28	−1.13	2.54	+1.20

Note: Baseline probabilities for the models represent illiberal dyads (Model 1), nondemocratic dyads (Model 2), and illiberal nondemocratic dyads (Model 3). Alliance variable is set to zero to estimate an independent effect of liberalism and democracy on conflict initiation (i.e., this makes it a harder test for our explanatory variables as a potential confounding effect of alliance ties is eliminated).

(Model 1 in Table 3) than for those in the democratic or liberal democratic models (Models 2 and 3). The log-likelihood ratios further point to the relative superiority of liberal model 1 over democratic model 2.

The control variables are statistically insignificant across all models except for power parity: a dispute is likely to be initiated against an equal power, and the predicted probabilities also show strong substantive significance. To test for any confounding effect of this variable on the coefficients for our explanatory variables, we also estimated a model without power parity (Model 4 in Table 2). Since the coefficients remain almost exactly the same, the impact of power parity is inconsequential regarding the validity of our hypotheses about liberalism and conflict.[17]

Turning to liberalism and civil war (Hypothesis 3), we can see from Table 1 that the difference between liberal and semiliberal states, including democracies, is not only relevant for their external conflict propensity, but it is even more striking when comparing their civil war proclivities. All liberal states, regardless of their level of democracy, account for roughly 30% of all nation-years but experienced only one civil war during the observed period. By contrast, semiliberal states account for roughly 42% of nation-years, yet for 65% of civil wars. This increased tendency to experience civil wars is apparent for both semiliberal democracies and anocracies, but not for autocracies. A comparison between liberal and semiliberal democracies in their civil war record is indicative: While the number of nation-years for semiliberal democracies is roughly three times smaller than those for liberal democracies (compare 9.08% to 28.06% of all nation-years), their share of civil wars is almost eight times higher (compare 14.06% to 1.56% of all civil wars). Overall, once liberalism and democracy are not conflated but rather observed distinctly, a number of different conflict patterns emerge that would be obscured otherwise.[18] These initial descriptive findings are now subject to a more rigorous statistical analysis.

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[17]We also examined the liberalism model 1 without power parity, and the coefficients for dyads with liberal initiators remain unaffected.

[18]Though not directly relevant for our study, note that if we are to compare democracies, anocracies, and autocracies, regardless of their level of liberalism, we find, consistent with Hegre et al. (2001), anocracies to have the highest propensity toward civil violence.

TABLE 4   Civil War Onset and Prevalence, Logit Estimates

	Civil War Onset		Civil War Prevalence	
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Liberal State	−.953*	—	−1.099**	—
	(.671)		(.563)	
Democracy	.694**	—	.783***	—
	(.330)		(.288)	
Liberal Democracy	—	−.833	—	−.525
		(.738)		(.596)
GDP	−.182***	−.164***	−.144**	−.132**
	(.068)	(.069)	(.079)	(.077)
GDP Growth	−1.110	−1.389	−1.562**	−1.871**
	(1.629)	(1.608)	(.859)	(.848)
Political Instability	.598**	.768***	.668***	.839***
	(.296)	(.271)	(.238)	(.239)
Oil Exporter	.420	.372	−.059	−.107
	(.339)	(.346)	(.487)	(.483)
Ethnic Fractionalization	.896*	.885*	.805	.856*
	(.681)	(.679)	(.667)	(.687)
Population (log)	.191***	.207***	.457***	.472***
	(.085)	(.088)	(.119)	(.116)
Terrain	.011**	.011**	.007	.008*
	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)	(.006)
Percentage Muslim	.007**	.006**	.006*	.005*
	(.004)	(.003)	(.004)	(.004)
Peace Duration	−.010	−.009	—	—
	(.010)	(.011)		
Constant	−7.409***	−7.567***	−9.450***	−9.623***
	(1.407)	(1.493)	(1.837)	(1.785)
N	2976	2976	3562	3562
Log-Likelihood	−250.834	−252.366	−1372.060	−1393.080
Model χ^2	89.98***	72.45***	74.52***	69.78***

Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. $^*p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$ (one-tailed t-tests). All independent variables lagged one year (see also Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2004).

The results reported in Table 4 clearly show that the correlation between liberalism and civil wars is statistically significant and negative regardless of whether we look at civil war onset or its prevalence. Note that including both dichotomous measures of liberalism and democracy in the same model requires us to interpret their coefficients conditionally. That is, the impact of each on civil war onset or prevalence is estimated conditional upon the other remaining zero. This surely is not problematic as we also estimate their joint impact (Models 2 and 4).

Models 1 and 3 in Table 4 indicate that, relative to illiberal nondemocracies (the excluded category), liberalism reduces the probability of civil war onset or prevalence even in the absence of democratic institutions. On the other hand, we find the opposite relationship for procedural democracies regardless of their civil rights record. Democratic states show a higher probability of civil war occurrence and prevalence. Table 1 suggests that it is possible to account for this result due to the substantial number of nonliberal (semi- or illiberal) democracies (one-third). Table 5 provides further information on the substantive significance of these findings, showing that civil war onset and prevalence are most likely in nonliberal democracies, followed by those with domestic instability and a large population. Overall, liberalism and economic development (GDP) have the strongest impact on reducing the probability of civil wars.

TABLE 5   **Predicted Probabilities of Civil War Onset and Prevalence**

	Model 1		Model 3	
	p	*Change*	*p*	*Change*
Baseline Probability: All regime variables (democracy, liberalism, liberal democracy) set to zero; political instability and oil exporters set to zero; all continuous variables set at their mean values.	0.85		11.02	
Increase Liberal State from 0 to 1	0.33	**−0.52**	3.96	**−7.06**
Increase Democratic State from 0 to 1	1.70	**+0.85**	21.32	**+10.30**
Increase GDP from $\frac{1}{2}$ standard deviation below the mean to $\frac{1}{2}$ standard deviation above the mean	0.06	−0.79	4.27	−6.75
Increase Political Instability from 0 to 1	1.54	+0.69	19.47	+8.45
Increase Population (log) from $\frac{1}{2}$ standard deviation below the mean to $\frac{1}{2}$ standard deviation above the mean	1.09	+0.24	17.78	+6.76
Increase Percentage Muslim from $\frac{1}{2}$ standard deviation below the mean to $\frac{1}{2}$ standard deviation above the mean	1.07	+0.22	13.32	+2.30

Note: Overall probability of civil war onset prevalence is 2.24 and 16.99 respectively. Baseline probabilities represent illiberal autocratic states. Changes in predicted probabilities are calculated as the change from 0 to 1 for dichotomous independent variables, and for continuous independent variables, they are calculated as the change from $\frac{1}{2}$ standard deviation below the mean to $\frac{1}{2}$ standard deviation above the mean.

Note also in Table 4 that the coefficient for liberal democracy cannot be statistically differentiated from zero, which is easily explainable because it combines liberalism and democracy, each having a countervailing effect as indicated by their opposite signs when individually estimated. This again validates our argument to examine separately the issues of how much the society is free from how much it is an institutional democracy. Although there is a moderate, though not significantly high, correlation between the two (see footnotes 12 and 13), the presented findings about their individual effects on using violence as a means to resolve international as well as domestic conflicts clearly warrants their distinct treatment.

As for the control variables, our analysis reinforces previous findings in the civil war literature (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre et al. 2001; Sambanis 2004). The correlation between civil war and the level of economic development is negative, while positive for states that are politically unstable, regionally mountainous, ethnically fractionalized, with the higher percentage of Muslim population, and generally highly populated states. The impact of liberal governance on the probability of civil wars has not been examined in the literature, but our study clearly points to a strong negative relationship. Although Collier and Hoeffler (2004) did not examine the impact of

liberalism on civil wars, their argument that rebellion can be explained by atypically severe reasons for grievances is theoretically similar to the logic behind our inference from Kant's theory. If there is the rule of law, a full respect of individual rights and freedoms, and the genuine representation of the public interests in a government's policy, the grounds for grievances against the state are virtually diminished. As Kant himself contended, it would be self-contradictory to use violence against the system that works for, rather than against, the interests and freedoms of its citizens. Our results support such a claim.

Conclusion

In our study, we addressed theoretical and empirical gaps in the Kantian tradition in international relations. Our focus was on domestic sources of conflict in Kant's theory, and we showed that, although democracy is consistent with Kantian thinking, the most essential elements of his "republic" concern the protection of civil liberties, the separation of powers, and the rule of law as barriers to arbitrary rule. Our interpretation of Kant's republicanism is in agreement with Kantian political theorists (e.g., Ellis 2005; Rosen 1993), yet liberal governance has

routinely been subordinated to electoral democracy in the democratic peace studies. The distinction we draw between procedural democratic rule and liberal governance is relevant both theoretically and empirically. Once we unpack Kant's republic in terms of constitutional liberal governance, we can uncover several levels of his reasoning behind the domestic sources for peace which were largely obscured in the previous studies. Not only do we find that monadic and dyadic views are consistent with Kant's theory, but also that both normative and interest-based explanations for international peace can equally draw on Kant as their theoretical precursor. We further demonstrate that, if we are to fully understand all constitutive elements of his republicanism, we can additionally infer that the Kantian legacy is related to a liberal civil peace as well.

Though one of our primary goals was to provide a theoretical contribution to the Kantian tradition in international relations, we also examined its empirical validation. The results of our empirical analysis strongly support all hypotheses inferred from our reexamination of Kantian legacy. While the results are mixed for the "democratic peace"—international and domestic alike—the findings are robust and consistent with our theoretical expectations concerning the impact of constitutional liberalism on both international and civil "liberal peace." The compelling evidence in this study validates Doyle's (2005) recent response to the critics of democratic peace, especially those questioning its historical validity (e.g., Farber and Gowa 1995; Rosato 2003), that the verdict is still out as previous empirical studies have not incorporated "the principles of liberal individualism"—the heart of Kant's republic. As Doyle points out, while these might "evolve" with "democratic institutions," "we cannot be sure of this" (2005, 466), and thus the theory needs additional testing that separately codes a liberal component. We precisely provide such an analysis, casting doubt on the critics' rejection of *liberal peace* on the grounds of empirical invalidity, though our analytical aim extends well beyond this empirical task.

Finally, our study is particularly relevant today. In the last "wave" of democratization, many states that are commonly categorized as democracies continue to have questionable records concerning the protection of individual freedoms, civil rights, and the rule of law against arbitrary rulings or policy implementations. Indeed, as our descriptive analysis indicates, there is a substantial group of states that fit into the category of semiliberal democracies. As comparative politics scholars point out, these are not transitional regimes, but rather consolidated systems that elude previous classifications, which typically conflate the liberal and democratic regime dimensions.

Like comparativists, but from a very different—that is, Kantian—angle, we also caution against conflating liberal democracies and "hybrid regimes." At the same time, we have gone a step further to show the implications of analyses for conflict behavior. Our empirical analysis validates the caution against quick conclusions about the peaceful prospects for these new regimes. As demonstrated in our study, if the spread of democracy is indeed going to lead to international and domestic peace, it must be simultaneous with the full development of what was at the heart of Kant's republicanism, that is, constitutional liberal governance.

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