
Applied Cryptography and Computer Security

CSE 664 Spring 2017

Lecture 3: Perfect Secrecy, Entropy

**Department of Computer Science and Engineering
University at Buffalo**

Lecture Outline

- **Last lecture:**
 - **classical ciphers**
- **This lecture:**
 - **elements of probability theory**
 - **perfect secrecy**
 - **one-time pad (Vernam's cipher)**
 - **entropy**
 - **language redundancy**

Lecture Outline

- **Recall how the security of a cryptosystem is shown:**
 - **computational security**
 - **unconditional security**
- **Today we study unconditionally secure systems using probability theory**
 - **given a ciphertext, no information can be learned about the message it encrypts**
 - **ciphers we already learned about can be made unconditionally secure**

One-Time Pad

- An example of crypto system that achieves **unconditional and perfect secrecy** is **one-time pad** (Vernam's cipher)
 - given a binary message m of length n
 - algorithm Gen produces a random binary key k of length at least n
 - to encrypt m with k , compute $\text{Enc}_k(m) = m \oplus k$
 - to decrypt c with k , compute $\text{Dec}_k(c) = c \oplus k$
- What properties does this cipher have and why is it so good?

Elementary Probability Theory

- A **discrete random variable** X consists of:
 - a finite set \mathcal{X} of values
 - a probability distribution defined on \mathcal{X}
- The **probability that X takes on the value x** is denoted by $\Pr[X = x]$
- We must have that
 - $\Pr[X = x] \geq 0$ for all $x \in \mathcal{X}$
 - $\sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \Pr[X = x] = 1$
- **Example:** dice from homework
 - probability distribution is $\Pr[X = 1] = \dots = \Pr[X = 6] = 1/6$

Elementary Probability Theory

- Let X and Y be random variables (defined on sets \mathcal{X} and \mathcal{Y} , resp.)
- **Joint probability** $\Pr[X = x, Y = y]$ is the probability that X takes value x and Y takes value y
- **Conditional probability** $\Pr[X = x \mid Y = y]$ is the probability that X takes value x given that Y takes value y
- X and Y are **independent random variables** if $\Pr[X = x, Y = y] = \Pr[X = x]\Pr[Y = y]$ for all $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and $y \in \mathcal{Y}$

Elementary Probability Theory

- **Example with two perfect dice:**
 - Let D_1 denote the result of throwing first dice, D_2 the result of throwing the second dice, and S their sum
 - What is the joint probability $\Pr[D_1 = 2, D_2 = 5]$?
 - What is the conditional probability $\Pr[D_2 = 3 \mid D_1 = 3]$?
 - Are D_1 and D_2 independent?
 - What is the joint probability $\Pr[D_1 = 3, S = 5]$?
 - Are D_1 and S independent?
 - What is the conditional probability $\Pr[S = 8 \mid D_1 = 4]$?
 $\Pr[S = 8 \mid D_1 = 1]$? $\Pr[D_1 = 3 \mid S = 4]$?

Probability Theory

- **Conditional and joint probabilities are related:**

$$\Pr[X = x, Y = y] = \Pr[X = x | Y = y] \cdot \Pr[Y = y] \quad (1)$$

and

$$\Pr[X = x, Y = y] = \Pr[Y = y | X = x] \cdot \Pr[X = x] \quad (2)$$

- **From these two expressions we obtain **Bayes' Theorem**:**

– if $\Pr[Y = y] > 0$, then

$$\Pr[X = x | Y = y] = \frac{\Pr[X = x] \cdot \Pr[Y = y | X = x]}{\Pr[Y = y]} \quad (3)$$

- **How is it useful to us?**

Probability Theory

- **Corollary:** X and Y are independent random variables if and only if

$$\Pr[X = x \mid Y = y] = \Pr[X = x]$$

for all $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and $y \in \mathcal{Y}$

- follows from definition of independent random variables and equation (1)

- This is what we need for perfect secrecy

What Does This Do for Us?

- Recall that a cipher is associated with \mathcal{M} , \mathcal{K} , and \mathcal{C}
- Let $\Pr[K = k]$ denote the probability of key $k \in \mathcal{K}$ being output by Gen
- Let $\Pr[M = m]$ define the **a priori probability** that message m is chosen for encryption
- M and K are independent and define ciphertext distribution \mathcal{C}
- Given M , K and Enc, we can compute $\Pr[M = m \mid C = c]$
- This takes us to the notion of perfect secrecy...

Perfect Secrecy

- **Definition:** An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) has **perfect secrecy** if for every distribution over \mathcal{M} , every $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and $c \in \mathcal{C}$ s.t. $\Pr[C = c] > 0$:

$$\Pr[M = m \mid C = c] = \Pr[M = m]$$

- **Interpretation:** after observing ciphertext c the a posteriori probability that the message is m is identical to the a priori probability that the message is m

Perfect Secrecy

- **Alternative definition of perfect secrecy**

- An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) is **perfectly secret** if and only if for every distribution over \mathcal{M} and every $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and $c \in \mathcal{C}$:

$$\Pr[C = c \mid M = m] = \Pr[C = c]$$

- This **means** that the probability distribution of the ciphertext does not depend on the plaintext
- In other words, an encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) is **perfectly secret** if and only if for every distribution over \mathcal{M} and every $m_1, m_2 \in \mathcal{M}$ and $c \in \mathcal{C}$:

$$\Pr[C = c \mid M = m_1] = \Pr[C = c \mid M = m_2]$$

Perfect Indistinguishability

- **Indistinguishability of encrypted messages allows us to formulate security requirement as an **experiment** or **game****
 - **interactive game with adversary \mathcal{A} , who tries to break a cryptographic scheme**
- **Our first experiment**
 - **for eavesdropping adversaries**
 - **using private-key encryption**
 - **asks them to distinguish between encryptions of different messages**
 - **let $\mathcal{E} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$, and we name the experiment $\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}}^{\text{eav}}$**

Perfect Indistinguishability

- **Experiment** $\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}}^{\text{eav}}$
 1. \mathcal{A} chooses two messages $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}$
 2. random key k is generated by Gen , and random bit $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ is chosen
 3. ciphertext $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_k(m_b)$ is computed and given to \mathcal{A}
 4. \mathcal{A} outputs bit b' as its guess for b
 5. experiment outputs 1 if $b' = b$ (\mathcal{A} wins) and 0 otherwise
- Given this experiment, how should we define indistinguishability?
perfect secrecy?

Perfect Indistinguishability

- **Definition:** An encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) over message space \mathcal{M} is perfectly secret if for every adversary \mathcal{A} it holds that

$$\Pr[\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{E}}^{\text{eav}} = 1] = \frac{1}{2}$$

– notice that it must work for every \mathcal{A}

- This definition is equivalent to our original definition of perfect secrecy

One-Time Pad

- **One-time pad (Vernam's cipher)**
 - for fixed integer n , let $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{K} = \mathcal{C} = \{0, 1\}^n$
 - Gen chooses a key k uniformly at random from \mathcal{K}
 - each key is chosen with probability 2^{-n}
 - Enc: given key $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and message $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$, compute $\text{Enc}_k(m) = m \oplus k$
 - Dec: given key $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and ciphertext $c \in \{0, 1\}^n$, compute $\text{Dec}_k(c) = c \oplus k$
- **Why is it perfectly secret?**

One-Time Pad

- **Theorem:** One-time pad encryption scheme achieves perfect secrecy

- **Proof**

- fix distribution over \mathcal{M} and message $m \in \mathcal{M}$

$$\Pr[C = c \mid M = m] =$$

- this works for all distributions and all m , so for all distributions over \mathcal{M} , all $m_1, m_2 \in \mathcal{M}$, and all $c \in \mathcal{C}$:

$$\Pr[C = c \mid M = m_1] = \Pr[C = c \mid M = m_2] = \frac{1}{2^n}$$

- by definition of perfect secrecy, this encryption is perfectly secret

More on One-Time Pad

- **One-time pad can be defined on units larger than bits (e.g., letters)**
- **One-time pad questions:**
 - **Since the key must be long, what if we use text from a book as our key?**
 - **What if we reuse the key on different messages?**
 - **Can we securely encrypt using a short/reusable key?**
 - **no encryption scheme with smaller key space than message space can be perfectly secret**

Perfect Secrecy

- It can be shown that
 - Shift cipher has perfect secrecy if
 - the key is chosen randomly
 - it is used to encrypt a single letter
 - Similarly, Vigenère cipher has perfect secrecy if
 - each letter in the key is chosen randomly
 - the message has the same length as the key
- (Shannon's theorem) In general, to achieve perfect secrecy:
 - every key must be chosen with equal probability
 - for every message m and every ciphertext c , there is a unique key k such that $\text{Enc}_k(m) = c$

Entropy

- **Entropy** H measures **the amount of information (or amount of uncertainty)**
- **The larger H of a message distribution is, the harder it is to predict that message**
- H is measured in bits as the **minimum number of bits required to encode all possible messages**

$$H(X) = - \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \Pr[X = x] \log_2 \Pr[X = x]$$

- **Examples**

Entropy

- If there are n messages and they are all **equally probable**, then

$$H(X) = - \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{1}{n} \log_2 \frac{1}{n} = - \log_2 \frac{1}{n} = \log_2 n$$

- Entropy is commonly used in security to measure **information leakage**
 - compute entropy before and after transmitting a ciphertext
 - if entropy associated with messages changes, leakage of information about transmitted message takes place
 - similarly, if uncertainty associated with the keys changes after transmission, leakage of key information takes place

Entropy

- Entropy after transmission is captured using **conditional entropy**
 $H(X|Y)$
 - $H(M) - H(M|C)$ defines information leakage about messages
 - $H(K) - H(K|C)$ defines information leakage about keys
- Perfect secrecy is achieved if (and only if) $H(M) = H(M|C)$
 - that is, it is required that M and C are independent variables

Entropy

- **Conditional entropy** $H(X|Y)$ is defined as follows:
 - for each value y of Y , we get a conditional probability distribution on X , denoted by $X|y$

$$H(X|y) = - \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \Pr[X = x|Y = y] \cdot \log_2 \Pr[X = x|Y = y]$$

- conditional entropy $H(X|Y)$ is defined as the weighted average (w.r.t. probabilities $\Pr[Y = y]$) of entropies $H(X|y)$ over all possible y

$$H(X|Y) = - \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{X}} (\Pr[Y = y] \cdot \Pr[X = x|Y = y] \cdot \log_2 \Pr[X = x|Y = y])$$

Language Redundancy

- **Absolute rate of a language**
 - is the maximum number of bits that can be encoded in each character
 - assuming that each character sequence is equally likely
- **In an alphabet of ℓ letters:**
 - there are ℓ^n possible strings of size n
 - if all of them are equiprobable, the entropy of a string is $\log_2 \ell^n$
 - then the absolute language rate

$$r_a = \frac{\log_2 \ell^n}{n} = \frac{n \log_2 \ell}{n} = \log_2 \ell$$

- **For English with $\ell = 26$, $r_a = 4.7$ bits**

Language Redundancy

- Now compare that rate with the amount of information each English letter actually encodes
- **Entropy of a language L is defined as**

$$H_L = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{H(M^n)}{n}$$

- it measures the amount of entropy per letter and represents the average number of bits of information per character

- For English, $1 \leq H_L \leq 1.5$ bits per character
- **Redundancy of English**

$$R_L = 1 - \frac{H_L}{r_a} = 1 - \frac{1.25}{4.7} \approx 0.75$$

Summary

- **Probabilities** are used to evaluate security of a cipher
- **Perfect secrecy** achieves unconditional security
- **One-time pad** is a provably unbreakable cipher but is hard to use in practice
- **Entropy** is used to measure the amount of uncertainty of the encryption key given a ciphertext
- **Next time:**
 - private-key encryption
 - computational security