Cognitive Significance, Attitude Ascriptions, and Ways of Believing Propositions

by

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1. Naive Russellianism

Please consider the platitudes presented in (1).

(1)   *Some Platitudes*

We use names to talk about objects. We use predicates to talk about properties

and relations. We use sentences to attribute properties and relations to objects.

We say things when we utter sentences, often things we believe.

Nearly all semantic theories are consistent with these platitudes. But it seems to me that the

theory given in (2), which I call *Naive Russellianism* , captures the platitudes' spirit in a

particularly pleasing and straightforward way.

(2)   *Naive Russellianism* (NR)

a.   Words have contents. The content of a name is the object to which the

name refers. The content of a predicate is a property or relation.

b.   Sentences have contents. The content of a sentence is a proposition, which

is also what the sentence semantically expresses.

c.   Propositions have constituents. If a sentence S expresses a proposition P,

then the constituents of P are the contents of the words that appear in S.

d.   If a person assertively utters a sentence, then she asserts the proposition that the sentence expresses. If she believes what she says, then she believes the proposition that the sentence expresses.

(Later I will add another thesis concerning belief ascriptions.) I call the above theory "Naive Russellianism", a name I borrow from Michael Nelson, because it correctly suggests that the theory combines an appealing naivete about semantics with certain aspects of Bertrand Russell's semantic theories. Naive Russellianism seems to have been Russell's view before he wrote "On Denoting", and Gottlob Frege's view before he wrote "On Sense and Reference". Both seemingly begin their semantic theorizing with the presumption that Naive Russellianism is correct, for they apparently think they need strong reasons to reject it before they can justify alternative semantic theories. But despite the initial appeal of Naive Russellianism, Frege, Russell, and many other philosophers do reject it, largely for reasons having to do with *cognitive significance* and *attitude ascriptions*.

In this talk, I'll argue that these objections do not give us sufficient reason to reject Naive Russellianism. In this respect, I am (of course) similar to my fellow Naive Russellians, including Nathan Salmon (1986), Scott Soames (1988), Thomas McKay (1979), Michael Thau (1998), and others. But I differ from my colleagues in how I defend Naive Russellianism from the objections. When my colleagues defend Naive Russellianism from objections concerning *cognitive significance*, they tend to appeal to the notion of propositional guises, or modes of presentation, or (as I shall say) *ways of believing propositions*. But when they try to defend the theory from objections concerning *attitude ascriptions*, they tend to appeal instead to *pragmatics*.

I think that the problems that cognitive significance and attitude ascriptions present for Naive

Russellianism are virtually the same. I think Naive Russellians can reply persuasively to *both*

problems simply by making use of the notion of ways of believing. I think that this sort of

common reply is much more persuasive than typical Naive Russellian appeals to pragmatics.

Many philosophers are under the impression that Naive Russellians *must* rely on

pragmatics in order to deal with problems concerning attitude ascriptions. But many of these

philosophers remain unpersuaded by these appeals to pragmatics. By providing an alternative

reply to the problem of attitude ascriptions, I hope to persuade these philosophers that Naive

Russellianism is more plausible than they currently think.[1]

2. Cognitive Significance

Frege asserted that pairs of sentences with forms (3) and (4), such as sentences (5) and

(6), can differ in cognitive significance.

(3) $a=a$

(4) $a=b$

(5)   Hesperus is identical with Hesperus.

(6)   Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus.

I don't want to try to figure out exactly what Frege meant by 'cognitive significance'. But I think

that there is a *sufficient condition* for difference in cognitive significance that Frege clearly

accepted, and that is even now commonly accepted.

(7)   *A Sufficient Condition for Difference in Cognitive Significance*

        If there is a rational speaker who understands two sentences, and believes that one

is true and the other is false, then those sentences differ in cognitive significance. Clearly, (5) and (6) can differ in cognitive significance in this sense, for a rational speaker like Hammurabi may understand them and yet think that (5) is true and (6) is false. But according to Naive Russellianism, they express the same *singular* proposition containing Venus as a constituent, which we can represent with (5p).[2]

(5p)   <Venus, Venus, Identity>

From these facts, there is a straightforward argument to the conclusion that Naive Russellianism is incorrect.

(8)   *A Problem with Cognitive Significance for NR*

   a.   There is a rational agent who understands (5) and (6), and believes that (5) is true and (6) is false.

   b.   If a rational agent understands (5) and (6), and believes that (5) is true and (6) is false, then he believes the proposition expressed by (5) and the negation of the proposition expressed by (6).

   c.   Therefore, there is a rational agent who believes the proposition expressed by (5) and the negation of the proposition expressed by (6).

   d.   If NR is true, then (5) expresses the same proposition as (6).

   e.   Therefore, if NR is true, then there is a rational agent who believes the proposition expressed by (5) and the negation of that very same proposition.

   f.   No rational agent believes a proposition and its negation.

   g.   Therefore, NR is not true.

Many philosophers, including Frege and Russell, embrace the conclusion of this argument. But I think it's safe to say that Frege's and Russell's alternative theories are unacceptable; moreover, it has turned out to be difficult to formulate a non-problematic alternative to Naive Russellianism. Thus, given the initial intuitive appeal of Naive Russellianism, it's reasonable to consider whether we should reject the argument's conclusion and "hang on" to Naive Russellianism. Of course, we would then need to reject one of the argument's premises.

I, among others, think that we can plausibly deny (8f); that is, we can say that there are rational agents who believe both a proposition and its negation. *Some* agents who believe a proposition and its negation are irrational. But not all are; in fact, some who believe both a proposition and its negation are veritable paradigms of rationality. In particular, a completely rational agent can believe both a proposition and its negation, as long as she does so *in suitably different ways*.

3. Ways of Believing Propositions, the Many Ways of Believing Reply to (8), and Many Ways Naive Russellianism

I now want to explain and justify the idea that a proposition can be believed in different ways. I can best begin by presenting an analogy with *assertion*. It's intuitive to think that there are different ways to *assert* the same proposition. Consider (9).

(9)   a.   Fred: "I am hungry".

        b.   Wilma: "You are hungry" [addressing Fred].

As David Kaplan (1989) and John Perry (1979) have pointed out, there's a clear sense in which Fred and Wilma *say the same thing* with their indexical utterances. Thus it's reasonable for a

Naive Russellian (or anyone else, for that matter) to think that Fred and Wilma assert the same proposition. But obviously Fred and Wilma use different sentences with different linguistic meanings to assert this same proposition. Thus we can reasonably say that Fred and Wilma assert the same proposition in different *ways*. Now if they *sincerely* assert the same proposition, then they *believe* the same proposition. But presumably there is a difference in the *ways* in which they *believe* that proposition, a difference that corresponds to the difference in the ways in which they *assert* the proposition. This difference in ways of believing shows up in their behavior: for example, Fred looks for food, but Wilma does not.

There are other examples involving indexicals, presented by Perry (1979), that suggest that a single person can believe both a proposition and its negation, as long as he does so in suitably different ways. Consider (10), which I hope will remind you of Perry's famous example.

(10)   Fred: "I am not making a mess, but *he* is."   [said while Fred points towards a

        reflection of himself from an odd angle]

Finally, reflections on the *metaphysics* of belief also make plausible the idea that the same proposition can be believed in distinct ways. Believing is a binary *relation* that can hold between agents and propositions. But it's reasonable to think that in order to have the relational property of believing-proposition-P, one must be in an internal state of a certain sort. Let's say that believing-that-P requires that one be in some sort of *belief state* (as Perry [1979] calls it). Such a state is a state of the brain or soul; it is representational in nature; perhaps it represents what it does in virtue of its relations to things in the external world. But, in any case, the essential point is that there is a plausible distinction between (on the one hand) proposition P, and (on the other hand) a belief state in virtue of which an agent believes proposition P. (It's perhaps easy to

confuse the two because both the belief state and the proposition could reasonably be called a "belief".)

Once this distinction between a belief state and proposition is made, it raises the possibility of there being several distinct belief states such that being in any of one of them is sufficient for believing the proposition. These belief states would differ from each other in the ways that such belief states typically do, for example, in causal role, but they would all result in the agent's believing the same proposition. We could then plausibly say that *each of the belief states is a **distinct way** to believe proposition P*.

This hypothesis will appear even more plausible if we find plausible the idea that belief states involve tokenings of sentence-like mental representations. On such a view, there might be distinct mental sentences that have the same propositional content, just as there are distinct natural language sentences that have the same propositional content. If so, then a person might rationally believe both a proposition and its negation by having suitably different sentences in his *belief box*, to borrow a metaphor from Stephen Schiffer (1981). For instance, a rational person might have both (5) and (6n) in his belief box.

(5)   Hesperus is identical with Hesperus.

(6n)   Hesperus is not identical with Phosphorus.

Thus analogies with assertion, and reflections on the metaphysics of belief, make it reasonable to think that an agent can believe a single proposition in distinct ways, and that a rational agent can believe a proposition and its negation, as long as she does so in suitably different ways. Thus many philosophers reject line (8f), and justify their rejection by appeal to different ways of believing a single proposition. Let's call this reply to argument (8) the "Many

7

Ways of Believing Reply" and let's say that Naive Russellians who accept it are "*Many Ways* Naive Russellians".

4. No Way Naive Russellianism and the Purely Pragmatic Reply to (8)

I shall soon argue that Naive Russellians should respond in a similar way to the apparent problems that their view has with *attitude ascriptions*. But before turning to that matter, I want to criticize an alternative Naive Russellian reply to the problem of cognitive significance.

Let's imagine a Naive Russellian who *rejects* the existence of ways of believing. On his view, people simply stand in the believing relation to propositions, and there are no guises, or intermediary representations, or ways of believing propositions. Let's say that such a theorist is a "*No Way* Naive Russellian". Michael Thau (1998) is a real example of a No Way Naive Russellian, and in a forthcoming book, Scott Soames seems to sympathize with the view.[3]

Obviously, No Way Naive Russellians must reject the Many Ways of Believing Reply to argument (8). Can they formulate an alternative reply? Well, they might offer what I shall call the *Purely Pragmatic Reply*. This reply appeals to differences in the pragmatics of the two sentences, and makes *no* appeal to distinct ways of believing the same proposition. According to it, (5) and (6) really do semantically express the same proposition; but they differ in what they "suggest" or "insinuate" or "conversationally implicate" or (as I shall say) *pragmatically convey*. For instance, an utterance of (5) might pragmatically convey the proposition expressed by either (11) or (13), whereas an utterance of (6) might pragmatically convey the proposition expressed by either (12) or (14).

(5)   Hesperus is identical with Hesperus.

(6)   Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus.

(11)   The referent of 'Hesperus' is identical with the referent of 'Hesperus'.

(12)   The referent of 'Hesperus' is identical with the referent of 'Phosphorus'.

(13)   The brightest heavenly body visible in the evening is identical with the brightest heavenly body visible in the evening.

(14)   The brightest heavenly body visible in the evening is identical with the brightest heavenly body visible in the morning.

The proposition that (5) pragmatically conveys really can differ in truth value from the proposition that (6) pragmatically conveys. Moreover, a rational person may confuse the proposition that a sentence pragmatically conveys with the proposition that it semantically expresses. The result may be that a rational person could think that (5) is true and (6) is false, even though they semantically express the same proposition. I believe that this is approximately the way in which Thau (1998) deals with problems of cognitive significance, and I think that it is similar in important respects to Soames's way of dealing with cognitive significance in his forthcoming book.[4]

Those of you who know the literature on attitude ascriptions will recognize that the Purely Pragmatic Reply strongly resembles the most popular Naive Russellian reply to objections concerning substitution in attitude ascriptions. But I believe that there are serious problems with the Purely Pragmatic Reply, and that this has implications for how Naive Russellians ought to respond to the objections concerning attitude ascriptions.[5]

5. First Criticism of the Purely Pragmatic Reply to (8)

Salmon (1986) has pointed out one serious problem with the Purely Pragmatic Reply to argument (8). Speakers can be trained to distinguish between the proposition that a sentence semantically expresses and the propositions that it pragmatically conveys. For instance, utterances of sentence (15) often pragmatically convey the proposition expressed by (16).

(15) Some conservatives are compassionate.

(16) Not all conservatives are compassionate.

Some speakers might therefore think that (16) must be true in order for (15) to be true. But speakers can be taught to distinguish between the proposition that (15) semantically expresses and the propositions that (15) pragmatically conveys. So they can learn to recognize their error. And they can generalize this skill. However, this sort of training won't help Hammurabi. No matter how well Hammurabi distinguishes between semantics and pragmatics, he will continue to think that (5) is true and (6) is false. And so his judgments don't seem to be due to a confusion of semantics with pragmatics.

6. Second Criticism of the Purely Pragmatic Reply to (8)

There is a second serious, but mostly unrecognized, problem for No Way Naive Russellians and the Purely Pragmatic Reply. To present this problem, it will be convenient for me to concentrate on one particular version of the reply, the version that says that (5) and (6) pragmatically convey the propositions expressed by (13) and (14), respectively.

(5) Hesperus is identical with Hesperus.

(6) Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus.

(13)   The brightest heavenly body visible in the evening is identical with the brightest
        heavenly body visible in the evening.

(14)   The brightest heavenly body visible in the evening is identical with the brightest
        heavenly body visible in the morning.

The Purely Pragmatic Reply says that utterances of (6) pragmatically convey to Hammurabi the proposition expressed by (14); he then confuses these two propositions, and thinks that proposition (14) must be true in order for the utterance of (6) to be true. But (the reply continues) Hammurabi does not believe the proposition expressed by (14); in fact, he believes its negation. So he thinks that (6) is false.

I claim, however, that No Way Naive Russellians cannot plausibly maintain that Hammurabi fails to believe proposition (14), at least not in certain sorts of cases. For No Way Naive Russellians still *allow* Hammurabi to believe singular propositions about Venus. And if Hammurabi does believe certain singular propositions about Venus, and there are no ways-of-believing, then he should believe the proposition expressed by (14).

Let me explain. Consider sentences (17) and (18), and the singular propositions that they express, which I will represent (in oversimplified form) with (17p) and (18p).[6]

(17)   Hesperus is identical with the brightest heavenly body visible in the evening.

(18)   Phosphorus is identical with the brightest heavenly body visible in the morning.

(17p)   <Venus, THE BHBVE, Identity>

(18p)   <Venus, THE BHBVM, Identity>

No Way Naive Russellians *allow* Hammurabi to believe (17p) and (18p). For instance, if Hammurabi points at Venus in the evening and sincerely utters "That is the brightest heavenly

body visible in the evening", then he believes proposition (17p). And if he points at Venus in the morning and sincerely utters "That is the brightest heavenly body visible in the morning", then he believes (18p). But clearly Hammurabi could do all this, and still think that (5) is true and (6) is false. So let's suppose that Hammurabi believes (17p) and (18p), and thinks that (5) is true and (6) is false.[7] Let's suppose further that, immediately after Hammurabi goes through his pointing ceremonies, we ask him to reflect on the beliefs he has just expressed, and to think carefully about what follows from them. Suppose that he is a good logician, and we give him plenty of time to think. Still, he could believe that (5) is true and (6) is false.

Now we have a problem for the Purely Pragmatic Reply. For take a good look at propositions (17p) and (18p). Notice that they entail proposition (19p) (by something like transitivity of identity).[8]

(19p)   <THE BHBVE, THE BHBVM, Identity>

Notice also that the inference from (17p) and (18p) to (19p) is an inference of the sort that ordinary speakers easily make: from the assumptions that x is the F and that x is the G, they easily infer that the F is the G. Recall, also, that according to the Purely Pragmatic Reply, there are no ways-of-believing: Hammurabi just flat out believes (17p) and (18p), without any interference from representations or ways of believing. Thus, on this view, Hammurabi has a "clear view" of propositions (17p) and (18p), so to speak. Therefore, it seems that there is nothing to prevent Hammurabi from noticing that (17p) and (18p) entail (19p). So on the Purely Pragmatic Reply, if Hammurabi believes (17p) and (18p), and is a good logician, and reflects enough, then he should believe (19p).

But now notice that (19p) is just the proposition expressed by (14)! So Hammurabi

should believe the proposition expressed by (14). Moreover, recall that the Purely Pragmatic Reply says that, in our case, Hammurabi does *not* believe proposition (14); in fact, he believes its negation; that's (allegedly) why he believes that sentence (6) is false. So it seems that the Purely Pragmatic Reply implies that Hammurabi both does and does *not* believe the proposition expressed by (14). So the Purely Pragmatic Reply must be incorrect, and cannot account for Hammurabi's belief that sentence (6) is false.

Here is an explicit, semi-formal presentation of my argument against the Purely Pragmatic Reply.

(20) a. Hammurabi believes that (5) is true and (6) is false.

      b. If (a), then: if the Purely Pragmatic Reply is correct, then Hammurabi does not believe the proposition expressed by (14).

      c. Therefore, if the Purely Pragmatic Reply is correct, then Hammurabi does not believe the proposition expressed by (14).

      d. Hammurabi believes propositions (17p) and (18p), and is a good logician, and is sufficiently reflective.

      e. If the Purely Pragmatic Reply is correct, then there are no ways-of-believing.

      f. If there are no ways-of-believing, then: if Hammurabi believes propositions (17p) and (18p), and is a good logician, and is sufficiently reflective, then he believes proposition (19p).

      g. Therefore, if the Purely Pragmatic Reply is correct, then Hammurabi believes proposition (19p). [from d, e, f]

h. Proposition (19p) is the proposition expressed by (14).

i. Therefore, if the Purely Pragmatic Reply is correct, then Hammurabi believes the proposition expressed by (14). [from g, h]

j. Therefore, if the Purely Pragmatic Reply is correct, then Hammurabi believes the proposition expressed by (14) and also does not believe it. [from c, i]

k. Therefore, the Purely Pragmatic Reply is incorrect.

This refutation of the Purely Pragmatic Reply can be reformulated so as to apply to any version of it, including, for instance, a version that relies on the metalinguistic propositions (11) and (12).

Can a No Way Naive Russellian avoid this refutation of the Purely Pragmatic Reply? Only, it seems, by denying (20f): he would have to say that there are no ways-of-believing, but nevertheless Hammurabi could believe propositions (17p) and (18p) and fail to believe (19p), even after careful reflection.[9] But can a No Way Naive Russellian *plausibly* deny (20f)? Can he offer a plausible explanation of Hammurabi's failure to make the inference?

Someone who thinks that there *are* ways-of-believing (like me) *can* give a plausible explanation of how Hammurabi could believe (17p) and (18p) and yet not believe (19p). *I* can say that Hammurabi believes (17p) *in one way*, a "Hesperus" way, whereas he believes (18p) in a *different* way, a "Phosphorus" way. Furthermore, he does *not* believe (17p) in a "Phosphorus" way, nor does he believe (18p) in a "Hesperus" way. That is why he does not deduce (19p) from (17p) and (18p). To make the explanation more vivid, think about it in terms of sentences in belief boxes. Hammurabi has *sentences* (17) and (18) in his belief box. But *sentence* (14) cannot be syntactically derived from *sentences* (17) and (18) alone.

14

However, No Way Naive Russellians *reject* ways of believing propositions. So they cannot borrow my explanation of Hammurabi's failure to believe proposition (19p). It seems to me that No Way Naive Russellians have *no* plausible explanation of Hammurabi's lack of belief in (19p). So I think No Way Naive Russellians cannot reasonably reject my criticism of the Purely Pragmatic Reply.[10]

Let me summarize what we've found out about Naive Russellianism and cognitive significance. The hypothesis that the same proposition can be believed in distinct ways is quite plausible. Naive Russellians can use this hypothesis to reply to argument (8) and other problems with cognitive significance. Naive Russellians who reject ways of believing cannot give a comparably plausible reply to the problem. I draw three conclusions: (i) the Many Ways of Believing Reply to argument (8) is the best Naive Russellian reply to the argument; (ii) (so) Naive Russellians should accept the existence of ways of believing; and (iii) the problem of cognitive significance, as represented by argument (8), does not give us sufficient reason to reject Naive Russellianism.

7. Attitude Ascriptions, Resistance to Substitution, and the Many Ways of Believing Reply

I turn now from cognitive significance to attitude ascriptions, and to belief ascriptions in particular. I shall now add a thesis to Naive Russellianism to deal with belief ascriptions.[11]

(1)   *Naive Russellianism*, continued

e.   The content of "believes" is the binary relation *believing*. The content of a clause of the form ⌜that S⌝ is the proposition expressed by S.

Given (1e), Naive Russellianism entails that (21) and (22) express the same proposition.

(21)   Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is identical with Hesperus.

(22)   Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus.

Thus the theory entails that (21) and (22) have the same truth value and are necessarily

equivalent. But it certainly *seems* that they can differ in truth value. Perhaps the strongest

evidence that they can is that it's possible for a rational person to understand both, and yet believe

that (21) is true and (22) is false. Let's say that such speakers *resist substitution*. Their resistance

to substitution suggests the following argument against Naive Russellianism.

(23)   *A Problem with Resistance to Substitution in Belief Ascriptions for NR*

    a.   There is a rational agent who understands (21) and (22), and believes that

        (21) is true and (22) is false.

    b.   If a rational agent understands (21) and (22), and believes that (21) is true

        and (22) is false, then she believes the proposition expressed by (21) and

        the negation of the proposition expressed by (22).

    c.   Therefore, there is a rational agent who believes the proposition expressed

        by (21) and the negation of the proposition expressed by (22).

    d.   If NR is true, then (21) expresses the same proposition as (22).

    e.   Therefore, if NR is true, then there is a rational agent who believes the

        proposition expressed by (21) and the negation of that very same

        proposition.

    f.   No rational agent believes a proposition and its negation.

    g.   Therefore, NR is not true.

Notice that this argument is nearly identical with argument (8). The arguments differ only over

which sentences they discuss: (8) discusses simple identity sentences, whereas (23) discusses belief sentences.

Earlier, we considered whether Naive Russellians can offer a plausible reply to argument (8). We saw that the most plausible reply is the Many Ways of Believing Reply: reject (8f), and maintain that an agent can believe both a proposition and its negation, as long as she does so in suitably distinct ways. It seems that a similar Many Ways of Believing Reply to argument (23) is the most obvious, and most reasonable, reply for a Naive Russellian. Naive Russellians should deny (23f). They should say that an agent can believe a proposition and its negation (even when that proposition *concerns belief*), as long as he does so in suitably different ways. There might be two different belief states, either of which is sufficient for believing the single proposition expressed by (21) and (22). For vividness, we might think of these belief states as consisting in having (21) and (22), respectively, in one's belief box. One can be in one of these belief states without being in the other; that is, one might have (21) in one's belief box without having (22) there. Doing so would cause one to believe that (21) is true and have no opinion about (22). One could even be in only the first of these belief states, while being in a distinct belief state that "corresponds" to the negation of (22); for instance, one could have (21) in one's belief box while also having the negation of (22) there. Then one would believe that (21) is true and (22) is false, and believe a proposition and its negation.

So it seems to me that the most plausible Naive Russellian reply to argument (23) is the Many Ways of Believing Reply: deny line (23f), and explain how an agent can rationally believe a proposition and its negation in suitably different ways. And given the difficulty in formulating plausible alternatives to Naive Russellianism, it is reasonable to conclude that we should *not*

reject Naive Russellianism on the basis of argument (23) (or arguments resembling it).

However, the Many Ways of Believing Reply has decidedly *not* been the most common reply to arguments like (23). Even those philosophers who accept Naive Russellianism for belief ascriptions, like Salmon and Soames, do not offer a Many Ways of Believing Reply to argument (23). They instead tend to appeal to pragmatics. I think that such pragmatic replies to the argument are less plausible than the Many Ways of Believing Reply, and make Naive Russellianism appear weaker than it really is. Let me explain.

8. The Pragmatic Reply to Argument (23)

Salmon and Soames say that (21) and (22) semantically express the same proposition, but pragmatically convey different propositions. The pragmatically conveyed propositions really can differ in truth value. Speakers confuse these pragmatically conveyed propositions with the semantically expressed ones. Thus these speakers come to believe that (21) and (22) can, or do, differ in truth value.[12] [13] Salmon, Soames, and other Naive Russellians have mentioned various sorts of propositions that might be pragmatically conveyed by utterances of (21) and (22). Sometimes they claim that (21) and (22) pragmatically convey metalinguistic propositions like (24) and (25).

> (24) Hammurabi would assent to "Hesperus is identical with Hesperus", in normal circumstances.

> (25) Hammurabi would assent to "Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus", in normal circumstances.

Sometimes they claim that (21) and (22) pragmatically convey propositions that attribute

descriptive beliefs to Hammurabi, like (26) and (27).

    (26)   Hammurabi believes that the brightest heavenly body visible in the evening is identical with the brightest heavenly body visible in the evening.

    (27)   Hammurabi believes that the brightest heavenly body visible in the evening is identical with the brightest heavenly body visible in the morning.

Finally, they sometimes claim that utterances of (21) and (22) pragmatically convey propositions about ways of believing. That is, an utterance of (21) conveys a proposition partly about Hammurabi's "Hesperus" way of thinking of Venus, and an utterance of (22) conveys a proposition that contains Hammurabi's "Phosphorus" way of thinking of Venus. These conveyed propositions can be semantically expressed with sentences roughly like (28) and (29).

    (28)   Hammurabi BELs that Hesperus is identical with Hesperus via "ID(HES,HES)".

    (29)   Hammurabi BELs that Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus via "ID(HES,PHOS)".

Here "BEL" is a predicate expressing the ternary relation between agents, propositions, and ways of believing that underlies the binary believing relation. The expressions after "via" are supposed to refer to Hammurabi's ways of believing.

9. A Problematic General Principle on which the Pragmatic Reply to (23) Relies

       I am skeptical of each of the proposals regarding the propositions that are allegedly conveyed by utterances of belief ascriptions. I doubt that metalinguistic propositions like (24) and (25) are pragmatically conveyed in all cases in which hearers resist substitution. I also have doubts about (26) and (27), because I think that hearers might resist substitution even when they

are unsure of which descriptive propositions Hammurabi believes. I'm especially dubious about the proposal that utterances of (21) and (22) pragmatically convey propositions (28) and (29), because I strongly doubt that ordinary speakers routinely entertain propositions about ways of believing, especially if these are mental representations.[14]

But I want to set aside all of my doubts about these details, and instead focus on a more fundamental assumption of the pragmatic replies. Each of the pragmatic replies relies on principle (30).

(30)   *A Principle Underlying the Pragmatic Replies to (23)*

A rational hearer who understands an utterance of (21) and an utterance of (22) will think that the utterance of (21) is true and the utterance of (22) is false **iff**:

a.   the utterances pragmatically convey two distinct propositions to the hearer; and

b.   the hearer entertains both of the conveyed propositions; and

c.   the hearer believes the first conveyed proposition, and believes the negation of the second conveyed proposition.

Call the material that appears before the "iff" in (30) "the left-hand side of (30)"; call (a) through (c), "the right-hand side of (30)". I shall argue that the right-hand side of (30) provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the left-hand side. So principle (30), the principle on which all of the pragmatic replies rely, is false.[15]

10. The Non-Sufficiency of Principle (30)

Let's consider sufficiency first. We saw earlier that Naive Russellians really must admit

20

that the same proposition can be believed in many distinct ways. Now *this also holds for the propositions that utterances of belief sentences pragmatically convey*: those conveyed propositions (and their negations) can be believed in many distinct ways. This has serious consequences for principle (30).

Let me explain by giving an example. Let's focus on the Pragmatic Reply that says that utterances of (21) and (22) convey the propositions expressed by (24) and (25).

(21)   Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is identical with Hesperus.

(22)   Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus.

(24)   Hammurabi would assent to "Hesperus is identical with Hesperus", in normal circumstances.

(25)   Hammurabi would assent to "Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus", in normal circumstances.

Let's also grant that utterances of (21) and (22) pragmatically convey the propositions expressed by (24) and (25). Now imagine that Betty utters (21) and (22), and that Wilma hears her utterances, and *does* entertain the propositions (allegedly) conveyed by them, namely the propositions expressed by (24) and (25). And suppose further that Wilma actually *believes* both the proposition expressed by (24) *and* the negation of the proposition expressed by (25). That is, she believes the propositions expressed by (24) and (25n).

(24)   Hammurabi would assent to "Hesperus is identical with Hesperus", in normal circumstances.

(25n) Hammurabi would *not* assent to "Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus", in normal circumstances.

Thus the right-hand side of principle (30) is true, when instantiated to Wilma.

But, contrary to principle (30), Wilma may nevertheless fail to believe that (21) is true and (22) is false, because she may believe the propositions expressed by (24) and (25n) *in the wrong ways*. For example, imagine that Wilma has *two* names for Hammurabi, "Hammurabi" and "Schmammurabi". Suppose that she believes the proposition expressed by (24) in *both* a "Hammurabi" way and a "Schmammurabi" way. In terms of belief boxes: she has both sentences (24) and (31) in her belief box.

> (24)   Hammurabi would assent to "Hesperus is identical with Hesperus", in normal
>   circumstances.
>
> (31)   Schmammurabi would assent to "Hesperus is identical with Hesperus", in normal
>   circumstances.

But matters are different when it comes to proposition (25n): she believes it in a "Schmammurabi" way, but *not* in a "Hammurabi" way. In terms of belief boxes: she does *not* have sentence (25n) in her belief box, but she does have sentence (32n) in her belief box.

> (32n)   Schmammurabi would *not* assent to "Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus", in
>   normal circumstances.

Finally, let's suppose that Wilma has sentence (25) in her belief box and (for good measure) sentence (22) itself in her belief box. So, altogether, she has the sentences listed in (33) in her belief box.

> (33)   *Sentences in Wilma's Belief Box*
>
> > (24)   Hammurabi would assent to "Hesperus is identical with Hesperus", in
> >   normal circumstances.

(31) Schmammurabi would assent to "Hesperus is identical with Hesperus", in normal circumstances.

(25) Hammurabi would assent to "Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus", in normal circumstances.

(32n) Schmammurabi would *not* assent to "Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus", in normal circumstances.

(22) Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus.

Now in this circumstance, Naive Russellians would have to say that Wilma believes the propositions expressed by (24) and (25n), because she has sentences (24) and (32n) in her belief box. So, as I said earlier, the right-hand side of principle (30) is true, when instantiated to Wilma. But if she has sentences (25) and (22) in her belief box, then surely she will think that Betty's utterance of (22) is *true*. So the left-hand side of principle (30) is false, when instantiated to Wilma's case. So principle (30) is false. (34) presents a semi-formal version of my argument.[16]

(34) a. Betty's utterances of (21) and (22) pragmatically convey to Wilma the propositions expressed by (24) and (25), and Wilma entertains those propositions, in "Hammurabi" ways.

b. Wilma believes the proposition expressed by (24), in both a "Hammurabi" and a "Schmammurabi" way; and she believes the proposition expressed by (25n), but only in a "Schmammurabi" way, and not in a "Hammurabi" way.

c. If (a) and (b), then the right-hand side of (30) is true, when instantiated to

23

Wilma.

d. Therefore, the right-hand side of (30) is true, when instantiated to Wilma.

e. Wilma believes the proposition expressed by (25), in a "Hammurabi" way, and also the proposition expressed by (22), in a "Hammurabi" way.

f. If (e), then Wilma believes that Betty's utterance of (22) is true.

g. If Wilma believes that Betty's utterance of (22) is true, then the left-hand side of (30) is false, when instantiated to Wilma.

h. Therefore, the left-hand side of (30) is false, when instantiated to Wilma. [from e, f, g]

i. Therefore, (30) is false. [from d, h]

So (30) is false. Yet advocates of the Pragmatic Reply still need to endorse *some* principle like (30). Thus they might wish to add a qualification to principle (30); they might specify, on the right-hand side, that the hearer must entertain and believe the proposition that are pragmatically conveyed *in the right ways*.[17] A roughly appropriate reformulation appears as (30→) below.

(30→) *A Revised Version of Principle (30)*

A rational hearer who understands an utterance of (21) and an utterance of (22) will think that the utterance of (21) is true and the utterance of (22) is false **iff**:

a. the utterances of (21) and (22) pragmatically convey two distinct propositions to the hearer; and

b. the hearer entertains both of the conveyed propositions *in the right ways*; and

c. the hearer believes the first conveyed proposition, and believes the negation of the second conveyed proposition, ***in the right ways***.

But once principle (30) is revised to yield (30→), the Pragmatic Reply begins to resemble my own Many Ways of Believing reply. Both the Pragmatic Reply and my reply now make essential use of ways of believing. Both say that the hearer will think that (21) and (22) are true and false, respectively, iff she believes certain propositions *in the right ways*. The Pragmatic Reply and my reply now differ only over *which* propositions the hearer must believe. The Pragmatic Reply says that the hearer will believe that (22) is true iff she believes what it *pragmatically conveys* in the right way; I say that the hearer will think that (22) is true iff she believes *what it says* (or what it *semantically expresses*) *in the right way*. But surely my own reply is simpler, more straightforward, and more plausible.

The Many Ways of Believing Reply also makes the following prediction: a hearer could think that (21) is true and (22) is false even if she never entertains any proposition pragmatically conveyed by (21) and (22). Thus my reply implies that the right-hand sides of principles (30) and (30→) do not provide necessary conditions for their left-hand sides. The Pragmatic Theorist disagrees. I think the next example will show that I am right.

12. The Non-Necessity of Principle (30)

On to necessity. Let's imagine that Fred is a student who has heard his history and astronomy teachers utter (21) and the negation of (22) many times. So he believes the proposition expressed by (21), in the right way, and he believes the negation of the proposition expressed by (22), in the right way. For the sake of vividness, we can imagine that he stores

sentence (21) and the negation of sentence (22) in his belief box.

Now suppose that Barney, a fellow student, utters (21) and (22), and asks Fred for his opinion about whether they are true or false. Recall that Fred has sentence (21) and the negation of sentence (22) in his belief box. Thus it seems that he could have an opinion about the truth values of Barney's utterances even if he didn't entertain the propositions that Barney's utterances allegedly pragmatically convey. So let's suppose Fred does *not* entertain any such allegedly pragmatically conveyed propositions. (He does not entertain any of the propositions expressed by (24)-(29).) Still, it seems that Fred would answer "true" to (21) and "false" to (22), simply because he has (21) and the negation of (22) in his belief box. So Fred thinks that Barney's utterances of (21) and (22) differ in truth value, even though Fred never entertains the propositions that the utterances allegedly convey.[18] Thus the right-hand sides of principles (30) and (30→) could be false, while their left-hand sides are true; so principles (30) and (30→) are false. (35) presents a more formal version of my argument.

(35) a. Fred believes the propositions expressed by (21) and (22), in the right ways.

   b. If (a), then Fred believes that Barney's utterances of (21) and (22) are true and false, respectively.

   c. If Fred believes that Barney's utterances of (21) and (22) are true and false, respectively, then the left-hand sides of (30) and (30→) are true, when instantiated to Fred.

   d. Therefore, the left-hand sides of (30) and (30→) are true, when instantiated to Fred.

e.   When Fred hears Barney's utterances of (21) and (22), he does not

entertain any of the propositions that the Pragmatic Reply says that those

utterances pragmatically convey.

f.   If (e), then the right-hand sides of (30) and (30→) are false, when

instantiated to Fred.

g.   Therefore, the right-hand sides of (30) and (30→) are false, when

instantiated to Fred.

h.   Therefore, (30) and (30→) are false. [from d, h]

Since the pragmatic replies rely on (30) and (30→), I conclude that we should reject pragmatic

replies to argument (23).[19]

In conclusion: I've discussed the problem of cognitive significance for Naive

Russellianism, as represented by argument (8), and the problem of resistance to substitution in

attitude ascriptions for Naive Russellianism, as represented by argument (23). I've argued that

the problem of resistance to substitution is basically the same as the problem of cognitive

significance. Naive Russellians need not, and should not, rely on pragmatics to reply to these

problems. Instead, Naive Russellians should reply to both of them by relying on the plausible

hypothesis that a rational agent can believe both a proposition and its negation, as long as she

does so in suitably different ways. Thus, the standard objections to Naive Russellianism

concerning cognitive significance and attitude ascriptions do *not* give us good reason to reject the

view. Given the initial plausibility and appeal of Naive Russellianism, I conclude that we should

(tentatively) accept it.

There are, of course, objections to Naive Russellianism other than those I've discussed here, for instance, objections concerning psychological explanation. But consideration of those objections must be postponed to another occasion.[20] [21]

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Notes

1. I presented much of the material in this talk in Braun 1998, but in a different order and with different emphases. The material in sections 4 and 6 is entirely new.

2. Some Naive Russellians hold that (5) and (6) express distinct propositions, because (5) contains two occurrences of the same name, whereas (6) contains one occurrence of each of two names. These Naive Russellians would reject line (8d) below. But the sentences "Hesperus is bright" and "Phosphorus is bright" express the same proposition according to all Naive Russellian theories; and there is an argument against NR that is just like (8), except that it appeals to these sentences rather than (5) and (6). So, for convenience, I shall assume that (5) and (6) express the same proposition, according to Naive Russellianism.

3. I *infer* that Soames is (now) sympathetic to No Way Naive Russellianism simply because he never uses ways-of-believing (or propositional guises, etc.) to deal with problems of cognitive significance and attitude ascriptions in his new book.

4. Two qualifications. First, the Purely Pragmatic Reply is a simplification of Thau's (1998) account of cognitive significance. But, in my opinion, the complications that I ignore here do not help with the forthcoming objections. Second, Soames thinks that, in the right sorts of context, speakers who assertively utter (5) and (6) do not (merely) pragmatically convey descriptive propositions like (13) and (14); such speakers actually *assert* the descriptive propositions. I think that my forthcoming criticisms of the Purely Pragmatic Reply apply equally well to Soames's view, with minimal modification.

5. One problem with the Purely Pragmatic Reply is that it's not clear which premise of argument (8) it denies. Does it deny line (8b) or line (8f)?

        8b.   If a rational agent understands (5) and (6), and believes that (5) is true and that (6) is false, then she believes the proposition expressed by (5) and the negation of the proposition expressed by (6).

        8f.   No rational agent believes a proposition and its negation.

An advocate of the Purely Pragmatic Reply might deny (8b): he could say that a person who understands (5) and (6), and believes they differ in truth value, doesn't really believe the proposition expressed by (5) or the negation of the proposition expressed by (6). Rather, what the agent *really* believes are the proposition *pragmatically conveyed* by (5) and the negation of the proposition *pragmatically conveyed* by (6). But this seems strange: does the agent understand the sentences and yet adopt no attitude towards the proposition expressed by (5) and (6)? Alternatively, an advocate of the Pragmatic Reply might deny (8f): he might say that some agents, like the ones we're considering, do believe a proposition and its negation. But then why does the agent count as rational? I suppose that such an advocate could simply reply that even rational agents can be confused in this way. But see note 10.

6. In (17p) and (18p), the expressions "BHBVE" and "BHBVM" refer to the properties *being the brightest heavenly body visible in the evening* and *being the brightest heavenly body visible in the morning*, respectively. "THE" refers to some appropriate operation on, or property of, properties. Nathan Salmon (1986, appendix) presents a view about the propositions expressed by sentences containing definite descriptions that is roughly consistent with my representations (17p) and (18p). Salmon's view of definite descriptions is rather Fregean, in that he holds (roughly) that they are singular terms rather than quantifiers. I am inclined to think that "the" is a quantifier, but I ignore that here, in order to make the representations simpler.

7. An aside: it seems to me that a proponent of the Purely Pragmatic Reply should admit that Hammurabi believes (17p) and (18p), *whether or not* Hammurabi goes through the ceremony of pointing at Venus and uttering demonstrative sentences about it. For proponents of the Purely Pragmatic Reply say that utterances of (5) and (6) pragmatically convey to Hammurabi the propositions expressed by (13) and (14). But if Hammurabi did not believe (17p) and (18p), then it's very unlikely that (5) and (6) would pragmatically convey to him the propositions expressed by (13) and (14).

8. I'm assuming here that propositions can bear logical relations to one another. See the technical appendix of Salmon (1986) for a theory of such logical relations among propositions. It may be inaccurate to say that (19p) follows from (17p) and (18p) *by transitivity of identity*. But whatever the logical relationship among these propositions is, it is of a sort that ordinary rational agents can easily recognize.

9. Well, there is an alternative reply to (20) for the No Way Naive Russellian: he could deny (20b). That is, he could say that Hammurabi does believe that (5) is true and (6) is false, but deny that if the Purely Pragmatic Reply is true, then Hammurabi fails to believe the proposition expressed by (14). Rather, if the Purely Pragmatic Reply is true, Hammurabi believes *both* proposition (14) *and* its negation. He believes proposition (14), because it follows from (17p) and (18p). But he also believes the negation of this proposition, and that is why he thinks that (6) is false. This is very different from standard pragmatic replies. But in any case, there is one outstanding problem with it: it says that Hammurabi (actively) believes both a proposition and its negation, and yet it tells us nothing about how Hammurabi could do this and still be rational. It does not, for instance, attribute his belief in contradictory propositions to the existence of distinct ways of believing the same proposition. And it cannot appeal to pragmatics to explain how he could believe both proposition (14) and its negation, for proposition (14) is itself alleged to be a conveyed proposition.

10. Well, perhaps the proponent of the Purely Pragmatic Reply would try the following reply. When Hammurabi goes through his pointing ceremonies, he comes to believe the following descriptive propositions: that *the thing he pointed at in the morning* is the brightest heavenly body visible in the morning, and that *the thing he pointed at in the evening* is the brightest heavenly body visible in the evening. Perhaps Hammurabi confuses these descriptive propositions with (17p) and (18p), and with propositions (13) and (14), and with the propositions expressed by (5) and (6). In any case, (19p) does not follow from these descriptive propositions;

that is why he doesn't come to believe (19p). In reply, I would ask the proponent whether he is *denying* that Hammurabi believes (17p) and (18p). Surely Hammurabi does believe (17p) and (18p), even if he also believes these new descriptive propositions; but as long as Hammurabi believes (17p) and (18p), the basic problem remains. Furthermore, it seems that if Hammurabi believes the new descriptive propositions, then he should also believe the singular propositions that Hesperus is the thing he pointed at in the evening and that Phosphorus is the thing he pointed at in the morning; surely he would assent to the sentences "Hesperus is the thing I pointed at in the evening" and "Phosphorus is the thing I pointed at in the morning". And so we are faced with an additional puzzle about why he doesn't deduce that the thing he pointed at in the evening is the thing he pointed at in the morning. This will be especially puzzling if we ask Hammurabi to reflect carefully on the preceding sentences. Thus I think that this reply does not solve the underlying problem.

The criticisms in this section and the preceding section point out, in effect, that the Purely Pragmatic Reply relies on a not-well-explained hypothesis that Hammurabi is confused. In my examples, Hammurabi is seemingly given the time and tools to rid himself of the confusions that the Purely Pragmatic Reply attributes to him. And yet Hammurabi still thinks that (5) and (6) differ in truth value. Thus an advocate of the Purely Pragmatic Reply owes us further explanation of the nature of the confusion that he attributes to Hammurabi. And he must do so without (in effect) hypothesizing that Hammurabi can believe the same proposition in many different ways (for instance, via many different representations). I doubt that he can succeed.

It seems to me that No Way Naive Russellians who accept the Purely Pragmatic Reply are trying to occupy an unstable middle ground between Many Ways Naive Russellianism and Fregeanism. Theorists who, like Frege, allow agents to believe *only* descriptive propositions can deal with problems of cognitive significance easily. So (perhaps) can theorists who, like Russell, allow agents to believe only a *very limited* range of singular propositions, e.g., propositions about themselves and their sense data; for (perhaps) agents cannot be "mistaken about the identities" of such objects (speaking very loosely now). But No Way Naive Russellians allow agents to believe singular propositions about Venus and other ordinary objects; agents can (loosely speaking) be mistaken about the "identities" of such ordinary objects. Advocates of the Purely Pragmatic Reply wish to deal with such problems of cognitive significance by appealing to agents' belief in descriptive propositions. But they allow agents to believe singular propositions that "say" that such objects satisfy descriptive conditions. This combination of views raises many questions about whether such agents recognize the logical relations among the relevant singular and descriptive propositions.

11. I hereby stipulate that Naive Russellianism includes thesis (1e). Theories that include (1a-d), but not (1e), do not count as Naive Russellianism. This is just a terminological stipulation.

12. Salmon's and Soames's positions are more complicated than I indicate in the main text. In his (1989), Salmon emphasizes that an agent can believe the proposition expressed by a belief sentence in many different ways, and says that this point is important to dealing with problems of substitution resistance. I agree with him on these points. But in this same paper, Salmon also says that pragmatics plays an important role in explaining substitution resistance. I argue against this below. In his (1988) and (1995), Soames appeals to pragmatics to explain away substitution

resistance. But in his forthcoming book, he instead appeals to the idea that, when speakers utter belief sentences, they sometimes *assert* descriptive propositions (such as (26) and (27) below) that go beyond the semantic contents of the belief sentences that they utter (see note 4). I think that my criticisms of the pragmatic replies can easily be modified so as to apply to Soames's new view.

13. The Purely Pragmatic Reply left unclear which premise of (8) it denies. The (impure) pragmatic replies to (23) also leave unclear which premise is being denied. Is it denying (23b) or (23f)? Salmon (1989) seems to deny (23f): rational agents can believe a proposition and its negation (even a proposition about belief), as long they do so in suitably different ways. But it's not entirely clear to me which premise other proponents of pragmatic replies would deny.

14. Saul 1998 presents detailed criticisms of a variety of pragmatic proposals, as do I in Braun 1998.

15. Advocates of the Pragmatic Reply would surely want to say that (30) is a *ceteris paribus* generalization. My criticisms in the main text below ignore the *ceteris paribus* status of the generalization; I try to take it into account in the notes to the main text. (*Ceteris paribus* generalizations are context-sensitive; this fact complicates attempts to refute them; but I mostly ignore that here; see Braun 2000 for discussion of their context-sensitivity.)

16. My argument does not take into account the fact that (30) is a *ceteris paribus* generalization. To do so, I need to add a premise to the effect that "other things are equal" in Wilma's case. An advocate of the Pragmatic Reply might say that Wilma's case is strange, simply because she believes the relevant propositions in the wrong ways. So he might claim that "other things" are *not* "equal" in her case, and that my argument against (30) fails, when its *ceteris paribus* status is taken into account. I have my doubts about this (hypothetical) reply, but I do not want to dispute it here, for two reasons. First, I think that the case of Fred in section 12 shows that (30) is false, even when (30)'s *ceteris paribus* status is taken into account. Second, the main point that I want to make with Wilma is that the pragmatic replies rely on substantial assumptions about ways of believing. The revised version of (30) that appears below in the main text makes some of these assumptions explicit. A Pragmatic theorist who gives the preceding reply should admit that the revised version of (30) makes explicit some of the "other things" that *he thinks* must be "equal"; so he should admit that the revised version is true.

17. To speak a bit more accurately: the advocates of pragmatic replies need to add the above qualification to principle (30) if the generalization is to be true in contexts in which different ways of believing are salient, such as the context I've created in this paper. See Braun (2000) for remarks about *ceteris paribus* generalizations and context-sensitivity.

18. Even if Fred did entertain the propositions that are allegedly conveyed, he might be agnostic about their truth values, and yet still judge that the utterance of (21) is true and the utterance of (22) is false. This is also contrary to (30) and (30→).

19. Argument (35) does not take into account the fact that (30) and (30→) are *ceteris paribus* generalizations. To do so, I need to add a premise to (35) to the effect that "other things are equal" in Fred's case. An advocate of the Pragmatic Reply could claim that, other things being equal, a rational person who understands utterances of (21) and (22) must entertain propositions like (25)-(29). Since Fred doesn't entertain any of them, other things are not equal in his case. I am unconvinced by this (hypothetical) reply. It seems to me that Fred's case is quite ordinary, and in no way abnormal, in any relevant respect. Fred responds to Barney's utterances as he does because he takes his teachers to be authorities about Hammurabi, and he recalls what they have told him; that is why he doesn't bother to think about what sentences Hammurabi would assent to, or about which descriptions Hammurabi applies to Venus, or about Hammurabi's ways of believing. This seems commonplace, to me. In any case, suppose that Fred's case *is* extraordinary, and other things are *not* equal in it, and so his case does not show that the *ceteris paribus* principles (30) and (30→) are false. Nevertheless, Fred presents a serious problem for the pragmatic replies, for these replies fail to explain why Fred thinks that the utterance of (21) is true and the utterance of (22) is false, even though he is rational and understands the utterances. But an adequate theory *should* explain cases like Fred's.

20. I've discussed some of the objections from psychological explanation in Braun (2000) and Braun (forthcoming). Mark Crimmins (in correspondence) has raised some related objections to the views I present in Braun (1998); I regret that I have not had time to discuss his objections here. There is another objection concerning logic that is immediately relevant to this talk, but which I haven't had time to discuss: according to NR, (22) is logically entailed by (21) together with the sentence "Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus". Yet Fred could think that the identity sentence and (21) are true, and that (22) is false. This might appear to be inconsistent with Fred's rationality or logical competence. So (one might conclude) NR is false. I discuss this objection in the last two sections of Braun (1998). I now think (thanks to comments from Anthony Everett) that I need a modest revision in the reply that I gave to the objection there.

21. Thanks very much to Jennifer Saul for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also to the members of an audience at the University of Rochester who heard an earlier draft of this paper, including John Bennett, Greg Carlson, Earl Conee, Richard Feldman, Jeffrey Goodman, Andrea Patterson, and Gabriel Uzquiano.