Ethics, Metaethics, Aesthetics, Practical Reason
I am interested in the relationship between different kinds of normativity, especially when it comes to sorting out the parallels and differences between practical, moral, and aesthetic normativity. I'm currently developing an account of practical reasoning, with a focus on the relationship between practical reason, morality, and our abilities. On my account, the ‘ought implies can’ principle is false for moral oughts, but has a deeper truth behind it, namely one about how we reason practically. I argue that our abilities don’t constrain morality itself, but they do constrain the kinds of conclusions that we can draw through practical reason.
Introduction to Ethics
Contemporary Ethical Theory
'Ought' Implies 'Can'
‘Ought Implies Can’: Not So Pragmatic After All
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):637-661 (2017)
The Virtue of Subtlety and the Vice of a Heavy Hand
British Journal of Aesthetics 57 (2):119-137 (2017)
Actions That We Ought, But Can't
Ratio 27 (3):316-327 (2014)
The Culpable Inability Problem for Synchronic and Diachronic ‘Ought Implies Can'
Journal of Moral Philosophy (forthcoming)
The Amoralist and the Anaesthetic
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)