I am interested in the relationship between different kinds of normativity, especially when it comes to sorting out the parallels and differences between practical, moral, and aesthetic normativity. I'm currently developing an account of practical reasoning, with a focus on the relationship between practical reason, morality, and our abilities. On my account, the ‘ought implies can’ principle is false for moral oughts, but has a deeper truth behind it, namely one about how we reason practically. I argue that our abilities don’t constrain morality itself, but they do constrain the kinds of conclusions that we can draw through practical reason.
2019 What We Ought and What We Can, Routledge
2019 “The Culpable Inability Problem for Synchronic and Diachronic ‘Ought Implies Can’”, Journal of Moral Philosophy 16:1, 50-62.
2018 “The Amoralist and the Anaesthetic”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly99:4, 632-663.
2017 “‘Ought Implies Can’: Not So Pragmatic After All, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95:3, 637-661.
2017 “The Virtue of Subtlety and the Vice of a Heavy Hand”, British Journal of Aesthetics 57:2, 119-137.
2014 “Actions That We Ought, But Can't”, Ratio 27:3, 316-327.